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INTRODUCTION
Just as the world community had almost given up hope for
a timely solution to climate change, new events have created
reason for cautious optimism that an effective solution may,
after all, be found at the supranational scale. In 2012, the 195
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) agreed that a legal instrument
with binding force is to be adopted by 2015 and implemented by
2020.1 In President Barack Obama’s 2013 Climate Action Plan,
* Professor Dellinger graduated from the University of Oregon School of Law at
the top of her class, Order of the Coif. While in law school, she interned for the United
Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change. After law school, she clerked for
the late Hon. Francis J. D’Eramo of the Superior Court of the United States Virgin
Islands and for the Hon. Procter Hug, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. She is currently an Associate Professor of Law with Western State College
of Law where she teaches Contracts and Sales and writes on international law with a
particular focus on climate change. Professor Dellinger thanks Western State College of
Law for the summer 2013 research funds for this project and the American Society of
International Law for the chance to present it at its 2013 Midyear Meeting. She is also
grateful to Western State College of Law librarian Scott Frey for his research assistance
on this project. The main research for this project concluded in the late summer of
2013.
1. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Durban, S.
Afr., Nov. 28–Dec. 11, 2011, Rep. of the Conference of the Parties, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1; see also Durban: Towards Full Implementation of the UN Climate
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the President finally promised that the United States will take
international action and lead global climate change efforts.2 In
the spring and summer of 2013, the United States and China—
arguably the two most important parties to a potential
supranational climate change solution—reignited their mutual
climate discussions and reached an important bilateral
agreement to jointly phase down hydroflourocarbons (“HFCs”),
one of the most impactful gases in climate change. This and
other related rhetoric is indicative of the two nations’ potential
willingness to accede to an internationally binding climate
change agreement, which in turn may cause a watershed in
negotiations and spur further action.
This would be in the nick of time. Science demonstrating
the onset of climate change is increasingly grim: global
temperatures reached their highest levels in the history of
modern records during the 2001–2010 time period and
continue to rise.3 The decade included a more than 2000%
increase in the loss of human life from heat waves,4 not to
mention the threatened loss of animal species. New facts about
the diverse problems of climate change continue to surface. In
August 2013, for example, the journal Science reported that shifts
in climate are strongly linked to human violence around the
world, such as spikes in domestic violence in India and Australia,
increased assaults and murders in the United States, ethnic
violence in Europe, land invasions in Brazil, police violence in
Holland, and civil conflicts throughout the tropics.5 The Fifth
Assessment Report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONV. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/
key_steps/durban_outcomes/iatems/6825.php (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
2. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 17–
21 (2013) [hereinafter CLIMATE ACTION PLAN], available at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf.
3. WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., THE GLOBAL CLIMATE 2001–2010: A DECADE
OF CLIMATE EXTREMES 3 (2013), available at http://library.wmo.int/pmb_ged/
wmo_1119_en.pdf.
4. Andrea Vittorio, Last Decade Sees ‘Unprecedented’ Extremes, Highest Temperatures
on Record, U.N. Says, INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 15, at 1008 (July 3, 2013). For
example, the 2003 heat wave in Europe caused more than 66,000 deaths and the 2010
one in Russia more than 55,000. WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORG., supra note 3, at 7–8.
5. Kathleen Maclay, Warmer Climate Strongly Affects Human Conflict and Violence
Worldwide, Says Study, BERKELEY NEWS CTR. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://
newscenter.berkeley.edu/2013/08/01/climate-strongly-affects-human-conflict-andviolence-worldwide-says-study/.
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Change (“IPCC”) recently concluded that it is “extremely likely”
(i.e., at 95%–100% certainty) that human activity is the principal
cause of climate change. Thus, there can no longer be
reasonable discussions about whether or not this problem is
man-made and, accordingly, about whether or not human
action is necessary to solve the problem.6
According to the International Energy Agency, carbon
dioxide (“CO2”) levels must be held to 450 parts per million
(“ppm”) in this century in order for us to have a chance to keep
global warming to the internationally agreed-upon goal of a
temperature increase of no more than 2°C.7 But in 2013, CO2
levels exceeded 400 ppm for the first time in human history,8
demonstrating the uphill and urgent battle to be fought on this
front. By putting climate change efforts on hold because of the
recent global financial crisis and a lack of political will to agree
on effective climate change goals, nations have managed to put
the world on track towards a 5.3°C temperature increase with
recognized and “potentially disastrous implications in terms of
extreme weather events, rising sea levels, and huge [related]
economic and social costs.”9 In fact, global temperatures have
already risen 0.85°C since 1880.10
Because the best predictor of future behavior is often past
behavior, it is doubtful that a large number of nations with
widely divergent interests in the climate context, such as all or
6. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Working Group I Contribution
to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis,
Approved Summary for Policymakers SPM-12 (2013) [hereinafter IPCC, Climate
Change], available at http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5SPM_Approved27Sep2013.pdf. “Extremely likely” denotes a 95-100% level of certainty.
Id. at SPM-2 n.2.
7. See Rick Mitchell, IEA Urges Policy Action on Global Warming, Worries U.S. Shift to
Natural Gas May Slow, INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 13, at 844 (June 10, 2013); see also
UN Climate Change Official Applauds US Climate Change Strategy, UN NEWS CTR. (June 25,
2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45270#.Um0tb5SicV0. The
IPCC operates with different figures that nonetheless show the clear gap to be closed:
Global emissions cannot exceed 850 gigatons of carbon emissions, but the world has
already emitted 530 gigatons, thus leaving only 350 gigatons to support the economic
development that developing economies need. See Martha Kessler, Top UN Official Says
Agreement Must Be Able to Accommodate Changes, ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (BNA) No. 189,
at 5 (Sept. 30, 2013).
8. See Mitchell, supra note 7.
9. See id.
10. See IPCC, Climate Change, supra note 6, at SPM-3.
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most of the 195 members of the UNFCCC, will be able to reach
the required consensus on a new treaty within the next year, as
they have, over the past two decades since the adoption of the
UNFCCC, not been able to agree on significant substantive
progress in the area. The good news is that they do not all have
to. Without a doubt, most nations have neither played any
significant role in the production of the problem nor do they
have much real relevance to its solution.11 This Article thus
argues that effective climate change action can be instigated by a
much lower number of emitters than scholarly and policy-based
discussions have promoted thus far, and that this is the only
realistic solution in the timeframe at hand. The “magic
number”12 or “critical mass” needed to give new impetus to
climate action may be as little as just three nations, and is
certainly less than “all the major emitters,” as most legal scholars
have so persistently promoted, at least until recently. Precious
time is ticking away. It is now necessary for international
lawmakers and scholars to embrace less ideological, but more
legally realistic, solutions to this issue, even though such
solutions may not represent cosmopolitan ideals of democratic
inclusiveness.13 The world urgently needs a solution that, in and
of itself, can help alleviate at least some of the substantive
problem, but that can also secondarily act as a catalyst for
further treaty membership or replication. Some may argue that
we do not have time to wait for such a stepped approach. The
response to that is that we have no time to continue promoting
and hoping for solutions that have already proved ineffective. If
we wait for everyone to do something, nothing will happen.
But, which are the most crucial nations to a new climate
change leadership constellation? Should a new, narrowed
11. Eduado Viola, Brazilian Climate Policy since 2005: Continuity, Change and
Perspective, CEPS Working Document, February 2013, at 2.
12. Moisés Naim, Minilateralism; The Magic Number to Get Real International Action,
FOREIGN POLICY, July/August 2009, at 136. The “magic number” is defined as “the
smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on
solving a particular problem.” Id. at 135.
13. ”Cosmopolitan democracy posits not only the furthering of government by
democratic popular election at a domestic level, but also the extension of democratic
process to governance between states at a regional and global level.” Jeffrey Scott
McGee, Exclusive Minilateralism: An Emerging Discourse within International Climate
Change Governance, 8 PORTAL JOURNAL OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY INT’L STUDIES (2011),
http://epress.lib.uts.edu.au/journals/index.php/portal/article/view/1873.
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regime complex only include the historical and present major
emitters? If so, is it realistic to hope that all of these major
emitters will join? Would it be wiser to attempt other
compositions such as the inclusion of nations that stand to bear
the worst consequences of climate change and nations that seek
the most far-reaching solutions, or would this present even
worse gridlock? Is it even possible to assess the scientific,
political, and symbolic dimensions of the “relevance” of nations
in this context?
This Article provides answers to the above questions. In
doing so, it breaks with scholarly notions that have, by now,
proved false. The Article challenges the viewpoint that all major
emitters are needed to form part of a new climate treaty from
the beginning. Even just a small handful of nations agreeing on
action could cause a shift in the currently stalled talks. The
Article also points out that whereas less-democratic negotiation
methods may not be ideal, they serve important pragmatic
functions in urgent contexts. In short, the Article promotes and
applies a legal realism methodology.
The Article first analyzes factors that have proved crucial to
treaty success in recent and more historical contexts. Much
current scholarship examines the same, relatively new, but of
course highly relevant, treaties. It provides additional insight
from a few of the world’s most successful treaties. These treaties
happen to be of slightly older origins and have thus
unfortunately become largely forgotten in today’s apparent rush
to reinvent the treaty wheel. The findings of this Article can
inform today’s treaty decision-making processes, in which parties
and scholars often fail to think “outside the box” and learn from
what has actually worked in the past instead of continually
promoting solutions that currently do not. Resting on this
foundation, the Article proposes a range of narrower
constellations for a new regime-complex at the supranational
scale that are more likely to be adopted than what has previously
been envisioned by scholars and policy-makers. The Article also
demonstrates that, in spite of some recent disappointment with
the UNFCCC, this is still the most likely and best climate action
governance architecture. Finally, the Article identifies nexuses
to other international agreements and describes how these may
work well as complements to, but not yet substitutes for, a
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solution under the auspices of the UNFCCC. As the focus of the
Article is on treaty development, treaty stipulations, compliance,
and review, procedures are not addressed.
Much excellent climate change scholarship has been
produced in recent years. However, and respectfully, some of it
no longer matches reality in international legal proceedings.
The Article takes a legal realism approach and posits that
enough theory has been written about who “should” join a new
climate change treaty and why; the time has come to look at
what can realistically be expected within the near future in this
arena. As has so correctly been said, a small club of key emitters
“could transform the credibility of climate actions and provide
an effective alternative to over-ambitious global negotiations
prone to [only] yield legal zombies.”14 The time has come to
look at climate treaties in new ways. This Article does so.
I. FACTORS DEFINING SUCCESS IN TREATY-MAKING; THE
“HOW”
This Section will analyze common denominators for success
in the treaty negotiation context. In contrast to many other
bodies of work, the focus here is not exclusively on multilateral
environmental agreements (“MEAs”), although some highly
illustrative ones are included. Rather, its focus is on select
treaties aimed at improved international cooperation within
economic and territorial issues, as well as science and
technology-related treaties. The climate change discourse has so
far focused extensively on environmental agreements, but much
can be gained from broadening our views and learn lessons
from, in particular, the financial context. This is so because, in
contrast to popular belief, environmental agreements are not
about the “morality” or “correctness” of being good stewards of
our natural planetary environment; rather, they are, at bottom,
mainly about money. If the considerations below—proven to
work—are taken into account when negotiating a new climate
treaty, success can once again be reached at the supranational
level, even in relation to this almost hopelessly difficult problem.
There is no need to reinvent the wheel in treaty drafting
processes.
14. David Victor, Plan B for Copenhagen, 461 NATURE 342, 344 (2009).
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As a threshold matter, “success” in the international
environmental treaty context can be defined as the written
instrument being a “focal point[] for building consensus and
driving . . . change in policy, at the institutional, state and
domestic levels.”15 Some of the most significant shared
characteristics are as follows.
A. Contextual Factors
Treaties are not made in a vacuum. Rather, they aim to
solve significant on-the-ground problems and address general
global developments. The “exogenous shock theory” holds that
external events increase the probability of treaty adoption
success when a window of opportunity exists that can be used
productively even if all other factors do not converge.16
The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) was established in
1995 to regulate international trade in an unstoppably
globalizing world. Thus, world trends helped pave the way
towards the treaty negotiation and eventual adoption. In the
case of the Antarctic Treaty System, analyzed in further detail
below, general fears of war spilled over into the treaty
negotiations, but with a positive result that lead to a host of
nations ultimately adopting a treaty to, primarily, avoid
territorial conflicts and war. In the case of the North Atlantic
Fur Seal Treaty, also examined below, the extinction of an entire
species of animals and the resulting collapse of significant
industrial sectors in several nations were at issue, but did not
always feature highly on the agenda of the involved nations.17
In the final stages of treaty adoptions, a favorable domestic
political climate is, of course, important, but the theory that
success in regime formation can only occur when the specific
issue enjoys a very high-priority status on the domestic agenda of

15. EMILY O’BRIEN & RICHARD GOWAN, N.Y. UNIV. CTR. ON INT’L COOPERATION,
WHAT MAKES ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS WORK: DEFINING FACTORS FOR SUCCESS 6
(2012),
available
at
http://cic.es.its.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/
gowan_obrien_factors_success.pdf.
16. See Natalia Mirovitskaya et al., North Pacific Fur Seals: Regime Formation as a
Means of Resolving Conflict, in POLAR POLITICS 22, 43 (Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko
eds., 1993).
17. See id. at 44–45, 55.
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each of the participants is simply false.18 In fact, the opposite of
the oft-repeated hypothesis seems to apply. For example, “it was
only after the issue [of seal extinction] had lost its priority on
the domestic policy agendas of the parties and ceased to be
considered an issue of high politics that it became possible to
settle it rationally and coolly.”19 Of course, although a treatyrelated problem does not need to rank highest on a national
agenda for eventual success, a favorable domestic political
climate, including the will to act swiftly, is for good reason
frequently considered crucial to the adoption of treaties.20
In climate negotiations, recent weather events, along with
the amount of sound science persistently presented by such
reputable organizations as the IPCC and the Union of
Concerned Scientists, present an opportune window of time and
contextual background for adopting a new international
agreement. However, attempts to give climate change an
extremely high priority on the national agenda of a very large
number of nations or even for the nations that are considered
key in this context is a waste of precious time. It is simply a myth
that climate change must feature higher on the political agenda
for a treaty to be adopted. The good news is thus that even if
climate change and closely related environmental issues do not
rank as high as other issues among lawmakers (as is
unfortunately the case in the United States and some other
highly developed nations),21 it is sufficient if the leaders of a
crucial amount of key nations can agree on a treaty.22
18. See id. at 44–45, 55.
19. See id. at 45.
20. See Camilla Bausch & Michael Mehling, Alternative Venues of Climate
Cooperation: An Institutional Perspective, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 111, 132
(Erkki J. Hollo et al. eds., 2013).
21. See TIMOTHY DEVINNEY ET AL., ANATOMY OF CIVIL SOCIETIES RESEARCH
PROJECT, WHAT MATTERS TO AMERICANS: SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC VALUES 38,
39, 46 (2012) (showing that “environmental sustainability” including climate change
does not rank among the highest twenty-five out of 113 of the most importance to
Americans, although it is not ranked among the bottom twenty-five either—the top
three priorities for Americans are clean water and sanitation, the cost of daily living,
and economic growth. The bottom three priorities are the right of commercial
domain, protection against over-hunting/fishing, and intellectual property rights).
22. In the case of the United States, the executive negotiates and signs treaties
whereas the Senate approves or rejects the resolution of ratification. See Treaties, U.S.
SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
briefing/Treaties.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2014).
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B. Incentivizing Participation
Most important to the adoption and success of a treaty,
both positive incentives for participation and negative
disincentives for non-participation must be present. Much
current discourse speaks to what nations “should” do and what
our “moral obligations” are. Although it cannot be ignored that
some nations may respond to moral arguments, it is clear that at
least in the American reality, calculations regarding climate
mitigation strategies are primarily a matter of cost-benefit
analysis. This includes the attitude taken by the United States in
connection with the failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol “because
the benefits of doing so were perceived to be outweighed by the
potential costs to the US economy.”23 Previous efforts have
amply shown that rhetoric describing the risks involved in
climate change does not suffice; economic incentives are
indispensible.24 This is particularly true in relation to the United
States and China, two perceived key players for whom unilateral
emissions reductions are insufficient drivers due to the negative
outcome of cost-benefit analyses.25 Simply put, major polluters
have so far had too little to gain and too much to lose from
Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) emissions reductions.26 Thus, simply
discussing “risks” and moral obligations is not enough;
monetary benefits must form part of the rhetoric.
1. The Money
The Montreal and Kyoto Protocols demonstrate the
economic considerations involved when some nations,
particularly the United States, decide whether or not to join a
treaty regime.
In the case of the Montreal Protocol, US officials were
aware that the nation’s own citizens were at grave risk from
depletion of the ozone layer and that even purely unilateral

23. Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1537–38 (2009).
24. Cass Sunstein, The World vs. The United States and China? The Complex Climate
Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 1676
(2008).
25. Id. at 1677.
26. Id. at 1680.
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action was still very much in the nation’s interest.27 The costs of
unilateral action to the United States without the Protocol were
calculated to be US$21 billion, the same as with the Protocol.28
However, the benefits to the nation of an international
agreement were almost triple: US$3575 billion with a concord
compared to US$1373 billion without one.29 These figures were
derived by, among other things, calculating the costs of the
projected five million skin cancer deaths and twenty-five million
cataract cases without global treaty action, compared to 200,000
and two million, respectively, with global action.30 Presented
with these facts, President Ronald Reagan—not otherwise an
environmentally inclined president—pushed hard for the
adoption of the Protocol.31 Because of these persuasive
economic considerations and, of course, other motivators as
well, other nations became willing to adopt the treaty.
In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States would,
in contrast, have to spend more than US$300 billion to gain
monetized benefits of only 4% of that amount.32 A 2.5°C
increase has been calculated to lead to damages as a percentage
of the gross domestic product (“GDP”) of key nations as follows:
India, 4.93% (with an expected loss of 3,600,000 years of human
life); Africa 3.93% (with the loss of 26,677,000 years of life in
Sub-Saharan Africa); Europe, 2.83%; United States, 0.45%; and
China, 0.22% (with a loss of 603,000 years of human life).33
Russia, however, stands to benefit by a 0.65% GDP increase by
some calculations.34 As will be shown below, Russia’s official
attitude towards climate change is hesitant because of the
perceived benefits to it of climate change and its self-proclaimed
“better” ability to deal with climate change than other nations.
Accordingly, Russia is seen as the “most difficult country”35 in
climate negotiations. Russia must, then, have reasons for both

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1679.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1680.
Id. at 1683–84.
See id.; see also Viola, supra note 11, at 2.
See Viola, supra note 11.
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joining and observing the treaty beyond a concern for the
climate itself.
The United States stands to lose 0.45% to 1.2% of GDP with
a 3°C temperature increase.36 For the United States, however,
“only” 13,080 additional deaths are to be expected from climate
change, which could be seen as not “so bad” given the fact that
car accidents result in over 40,000 deaths per year.37 Further
economic factors may be more persuasive: the average annual
agricultural productivity is expected to decrease by 39% due to
climate change just as water costs have been projected to
increase by 31.3%.38 The above figures reflect what has become
the accepted norm of a temperature increase of “only” 2.5–3°C.
Catastrophic warming would be more expensive and the
prevention of that could thus function as a better driver: The
loss to the US GDP because of more extreme warning would be
22.1%, the same as for Africa and China, whereas Russia would
suffer a loss of 33.2% of GDP and Europe and India 44.2%
each.39
Thus, if one believes that the projected temperature
increase can indeed be limited to 2.5–3°C, major GHG
contributors face the cost problem that by some calculations,
they have “little” to gain from emissions reductions and much to
lose.40 This goes for the United States as well—recall that the
benefits to the United States from tackling ozone depletion was
roughly sixty-five times the costs, whereas with climate change,
benefits to be gained are only three times the costs.41 Narrowly
perceived, key nations have so far not seen themselves as
potential victims of climate change. Hopefully, this perception
can be changed via economic and other motivators; otherwise

36. See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1683–84.
37. Id. at 1693.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1692.
40. Id. at 1680. In contrast, a recent UN report warns of “vast” economic damage
and “severe” economic disruptions caused by climate change. Justin Gillis, U.N. Says
Lag in Confronting Climate Woes Will Be Costly, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/17/science/earth/un-says-lag-in-confronting-climate-woeswill-be-costly.html?_r=0
41. See Frances Cairncross, What Makes Environmental Treaties Work?,
CONVERSATION (July 29, 2008), http://conservationmagazine.org/2008/07/whatmakes-environmental-treaties-work/.
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we may well find ourselves in the dire straits predicted by much
research so far.
It is clear that economic factors are important incentives for
both the developed and the developing world, but they are also
important deterrents. It is beyond the scope of this Article to
identify the most effective “sticks” in this context, but frequently
mentioned factors include trade restrictions and sanctions,
carbon markets, and carbon taxes. As an example, the Montreal
Protocol used both economic rewards for poorer countries that
complied with the agreement as well as trade restrictions and
other “punishments” such as trade restrictions for countries that
did not.42 Such threats contributed to changes in state behavior,
which demonstrates the crucial importance of economic
considerations to MEAs. It may, frankly, be necessary to give
treaty participants that otherwise would lose out on economic
side payments (“bribes”)43 to offset some of their costs of
participation.44 If this helped secure an agreement, everyone
would ultimately be a winner as there can no longer be any
doubt that continuing the current status quo would ultimately
be a loss to all.
The North Pacific Fur Seal Convention of 1911 (“Seal
Treaty”) and the United States-Japan telecommunications
agreement similarly came to life based on commercial interests.
Hailed as “one of the most successful treaties ever negotiated,”45
the Seal Treaty was the first international treaty to address the
issue of wildlife conservation and still represents “a major victory
for the conservation of natural resources, a signal triumph of
diplomacy . . ., and a landmark in the history of international
cooperation.”46 The Seal Treaty protected North Pacific Fur
Seals from pelagic hunting, which had almost driven the species
to extinction, and inspired subsequent national legislation such
as the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 in the United
States.47 Fur seals were a major source of income for the four key
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id.; see also McGee, supra note 13, at 14.
See Cairncross, supra note 41.
See id.
See id.
North Pacific Fur Seal Treaty of 1911, NOAA CELEBRATES 200 YEARS SCI.,
SERVICE, & STEWARDSHIP, http://celebrating200years.noaa.gov/events/fursealtreaty/
welcome.html#treaty (last visited March 13, 2014).
47. See id.
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treaty actors at the time: the United States, Russia, Great Britain
(on behalf of Canada), and Japan. The prosperous branches of
the economy in these nations were, at least in large part, based
on the same resource, the seal, and their wealth had been
diminished by the nations’ collective, but unregulated efforts.48
Economic, not environmental, concerns were the primary
motivators behind the Seal Treaty negotiations.49 Once experts
agreed that the overall health of the seal population was at risk,
consensus on developing a treaty was reached in spite of the
existence of some minor scientific uncertainties.50 This brings
hope to the current climate context, where a few scientific
uncertainties are still cited in some circles. As the Seal Treaty
shows, this can be overcome. In fact, climate arguments are
currently even more scientifically sound than the seal
discussions of a century ago were, as it can no longer reasonably
be argued that whatever few uncertainties still exist justify nonaction in the climate arena. But whereas modern economies rely
to a large extent on fossil fuels just as nations at the time
depended on sealing, our wealth has not yet been diminished by
our fossil fuel dependency, which contrasts with the Seal Treaty
background and may make it harder for nations to reach
consensus on a climate treaty. There is still very much money to
gain by using fossil fuels unless such use becomes regulated in
much more far-reaching ways than is currently the case.51
Carbon prices may have to be raised via taxes; undoubtedly a
sound step from a scientific point of view although not
politically popular in the United States. That finances played a
large role in the development of the Seal Treaty is further
demonstrated by the fact that the Japanese and
British/Canadian delegations outright demanded and obtained
proper compensation before consenting to the treaty.52 In other
words, the bargaining at the time was financially integrative and
interest-based. Parties to a new climate deal can learn from this
and take legal formative action on the realization that without

48. See Mirovitskaya, supra note 16, at 54.
49. See id. at 40, 53-–54.
50. See id. at 39, 44, 52–53.
51. See generally Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING
STONE, Aug. 2, 2012, at 52, 53–60.
52. See Mirovitskaya, supra note 16, at 32, 39.
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economic support to poorer nations and an overall working out
of economic interests among participants, a treaty may not come
about. Nothing new in that; a hundred years of international
diplomacy has shown the “pragmatic soundness” of that
approach.
However, when comparing the climate experiment to the
Seal Treaty, a consideration to be taken into account is that seals
were an international common property. Entry to the sealing
scheme by non-sealing nations was deterred in order to limit the
use of this common resource.53 In contrast, a stable climate is, in
similarity with ozone protection under the Montreal Protocol, a
public good requiring the effective management of national
resources for the good of all nations. Entry to the carbon market
by some nations cannot be deterred, unless a major paradigm
shift occurs under which climate rights also come to be seen as
property rights. This could stem from a clearer understanding
that fossil fuels are, at bottom, also a property resource that,
although individually owned by sovereign nations and their
corporations, is also, at a greater scale, a resource shared by the
relatively few number of nations who possess the resource. These
are arguably the nations that must come together in creating a
new treaty.
The Seal Treaty also shows the potential interplay between
equity and efficiency concerns: in the short term, it would have
been more efficient for the relevant nations to continue
hunting, but eventually, doing so would have turned inefficient
because of the likely extinction of the entire resource. Equity
prevailed. Under the “salient solution theory,” parties can, as
with the Seal Treaty, be made to realize that they have to
cooperatively accept legal restrictions or, ultimately, stand to
lose significantly at an individual as well as a collective basis.
Similar efficiency concerns will have to be utilized in climate
change: efforts to persuade hesitant parties must continue to
rely on the ultimate inefficiency at a national level in continuing
efforts that will lead to economic inefficiencies. The problem, of
course, is to convince such parties that their individual action

53. SCOTT BARRETT, ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT: THE STRATEGY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY-MAKING 39 (2003).
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will help and to find ways to effectively address the leakage
problem.54
The so-called United States/Japan telecommunications
agreement (“telecom agreement”) similarly took off on a
nationally motivated economic platform.55 At bottom, the
United States demanded increased market access to the
Japanese market to rectify a large trade deficit between the two
nations in the telecommunications sector.56 This move found
support in a global ideological shift away from national
monopolies and toward international competition, although
deep domestic policy change was not initially forthcoming.57
After years of extended negotiations that were often highly
coercive towards Japan, both parties eventually came to an
agreement when Japan’s trade ministry and political elite saw
the United States’ demands as being in the interest of Japan
too.58 Telecommunications networks, providers of vital
infrastructure for other economic activity, were seen as stimuli
for economic growth. For the first time, policy issues were
framed strictly using economic criteria in the international
rhetoric.59 Today, carbon is similarly seen as a backbone for
current economic growth. Economic rhetoric must thus be
embraced in the discussions pertaining to a new treaty to an
even larger extent than before.

54. In the climate context, “leakage” denotes the risk that if some nations curb
excessive Greenhouse Gas (“GHG”) emissions from their territories, GHG-producing
entities may simply move to other nations with fewer restrictions, thus simply moving
the problem geographically without solving it substantively.
55. Not a treaty per se, the name refers to an agreement reached after numerous
bilateral negotiations between the United States and Japan subsequent to the Tokyo
Round under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) auspices in the
1970s and the WTO “Basic Telecommunications Talks” in the 1980s and 1990s. The
agreement produced a Reference Paper; a framework of pro-competitive regulatory
policies that are not legally binding, but that become so with additional commitments
by the parties. See, e.g., TORU NAKAKITA ET AL., JAPAN INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, JAPAN-US
TELECOMMUNICATIONS NEGOTIATIONS IN A NEW PHASE: STATES AND MARKETS 3–4
(2012). Now, competition, and not monopoly, is considered the norm in most nations
and has been internationally accepted to benefit consumers and companies alike.
56. See Paula Murphy Ives, Negotiating Global Change: Progressive Multilateralism in
Trade in Telecommunication Talks, 8 INT’L NEGOTIATION 43, 49, 51 (2003).
57. Id. at 59.
58. See id. at 52, 54, 67.
59. See id. at 55.
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In short, economic motivators are key to treaty formation.
The Montreal Protocol, Seal Treaty, and telecom agreement
demonstrate this point, yet also show that even though finances
are one of, or even, the primary motivators behind an
agreement, much substantive success can be created. This holds
for the environmental agenda as well. As scholars, we ought to
stop what has turned into a somewhat naïve rhetoric that keeps
discussing what nations “should” do for “moral” reasons. Let us
become more realistic: money simply appears to matter more
than the environment per se in climate discussions, both
nationally and internationally. Softer arguments such as moral
obligations, animal extinction, the future displacement of
millions of people (which all of course also have economic
implications), and even military arguments, are not currently
the most persuasive “talking points” in the climate discourse.
Key policy makers have demonstrated this. For example,
President Obama’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan describes the
motivating factors for the nation adopting such a plan.60 This
Plan makes no less than sixteen references to the economy, jobs,
technology, oil independence, and health (for the purpose of
this Article considered an economic motivator), but only four
references to “moral obligation” itself or factors such as “future
generations,” “national treasure[s],” and “snow-capped
peaks.”61 Similarly, whereas a speech by Secretary of State John
Kerry to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation CEO Summit in
Bali in October 2013 called action on climate change an
“international moral responsibility,” it also described it as “a
practical business responsibility.” The speech further
emphasized that failure to act on climate change would create
uncertainty in the business community, but that finding
solutions to the problem will create a US$6 trillion industry over
the following decades, dwarfing the technology industry
revolution of the 1990s.62
60. See generally CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 2.
61. See id. at 4.
62. Anthony Adragna, Kerry Says Countries Have Responsibility to Work Together on
Climate Change Issues, INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) No. 22, at 1497 (Oct. 7, 2013).
Incidentally, private economy cost concerns are also the most important factor
affecting public opinion of climate agreements, although “people are also swayed by
treaty features that make cooperation more effective, distribute costs more fairly,
involve a higher number of participating countries, penalize countries that fail to met
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It is evident that work on a new climate treaty must take the
business and economic interests of key parties into account and
make sure that these are addressed satisfactorily to these parties.
The political awareness of the economy behind climate change
cannot be ignored. Incidentally, economic aspects are also
crucial to garner the politically required public support for a
new climate agreement: a new scientific study reveals that costs
are the most important factor affecting public opinion of
climate agreements and that people are more willing to support
such agreements if they involve lower household costs. For
example, an increase in average household costs to support
climate mitigation from 0.5% to 1% of the GDP decreases public
support by ten percentage points.63
2. “Rights-based” Rhetoric
In the climate treaty negotiation context, the United States
is often lamenting the fact that China, India, and other
emerging economies are sticking to their “rights to develop”
and are thus not willing to undertake total emissions reductions
targets. But, such rights-based arguments are also not new in
international treaty law and thus need not stand in the way now
either. The Antarctic Treaty System of 1961 (“ATS”) shows as
much. “One of the successes of twentieth century international
law,”64 the ATS was negotiated by twelve original signatories,
seven of which claimed rights to Antarctica as territorial
sovereigns.65 Although all parties eventually came to share the
ultimate goals of promoting science and using the region for
peaceful purposes, national territorial interests were the true
impetus for the treaty—not science, as myth otherwise has it.66
Granted, science was used as a tool of diplomacy, but it was
emission reduction targets and include monitoring by an independent third party.”
Rob Jordan, A New Approach to Making Climate Treaties Work, from Research at Stanford and
in Switzerland, STANFORD NEWS (August 20, 2013), http://news.stanford.edu/news/
2013/august/climate-treaty-politics-082013.html
63. Jordan, supra note 62.
64. Gillian Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty System: A Model of Legal Creativity and
Cooperation, in SCIENCE DIPLOMACY: ANTARCTICA, SCIENCE, AND THE GOVERNANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL SPACES 39 (Paul Arthur Berkman et al. eds., 2009).
65. Id. at 40.
66. See generally Rip Bulkeley, The Political Origins of the Antarctic Treaty, 46 POLAR
REC., no. 1, Jan. 2010, at 9.
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mainly for the added advantage of preventing unnecessary and
undesirable political rivalries in the region, as well as the
recurrence of international misunderstandings.67 Similar to
climate change, a practical legal solution was not forthcoming at
the international level: the treaty had to be created first. The
timing of the treaty was remarkable: it was adopted during the
Cold War with the participation of then-arch enemies the Soviet
Union (“USSR”) and the United States, along with such
competitors for rights to explore the region as Argentina, Chile,
Australia, Japan, and the United Kingdom, none of which were
willing to give up their asserted rights. Seemingly irreconcilable
differences existed, but nonetheless, a workable strategy was
developed around common objectives. A “pooled sovereignty”
model had first been suggested, but as individual territorial
claims were too difficult to overcome, Chile instead proposed
the current “status quo” solution under which territorial claims
should be “frozen” through a moratorium on new claims.68 The
treaty now has forty-six members, only five of whom mutually
recognize the territorial claims of the others.69
Modernly, potential treaty parties—most noticeably the
United States—similarly must come to terms with the fact that
some nations will not give up their national rights arguments
pertaining to development. No one can seriously dispute the
right of poorer nations to do so. Instead, a “status quo” solution
might be found in relation to climate change as well, but by
reframing the problem. For instance, status quo in climate
change could and must encompass the right to retain increasing
levels of development. But, instead of asking whether or not
nations are “entitled” to develop—of course they are—the
correct question is whether nations are necessarily entitled to
base such development on GHG emissions, or whether—with
crucial economic and other assistance—they can reach the
desired levels of development based on non-GHG sources. A
difficult question indeed, but if arch enemies could agree on a
67. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 86 (1960) (Exec. B).
68. Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty denied countries the right to assert,
support, or deny “a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of
sovereignty in Antarctica.” See Antarctic Treaty art. IV, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, 402
U.N.T.S. 71; see also Bulkeley, supra note66; Triggs, supra note 64, at 41.
69. See Triggs, supra note 64, at 40–41.
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treaty during the Cold War, one would hope that key
negotiating parties could not only come to the table, but could
also reach an agreement in these more peaceful times. The ATS
shows that irreconcilable supranational differences can be
overcome with persistence and innovative diplomacy. As with
the ATS, operational and scientific cooperation is also currently
needed in order for all nations to be able to share the natural
“resource” in the future. At the time of the ATS, the “resource”
was a region with potentially fruitful scientific development.
Now, a healthy environment must be seen as a precious resource
with a proven effect of economic development. In the ATS
context, widely divergent political interests existed within the
realm of both the problem itself (use of the resource) as well as
outside the problem (broader economic concerns), in the same
way as they do now in the current ongoing global financial crisis.
In some ways, the ATS may be seen as factually and
contextually different from current climate change, but in other
ways, there are strong resemblances that justify the comparison.
Just as the ATS member nations were motivated by national
territorial concerns, so too does the climate rhetoric have
significant national security implications. Both regimes implicate
the development and use of science for peaceful, yet nationally
advantageous, reasons. Even the physical surroundings are
somewhat similar: the Antarctic is a very remote and ethereal
region, as is the atmosphere, but both areas came to require a
supranational solution. The ATS thus sets valuable precedent
for how nations may come to give up old arguments and start
over using new, shared goals as a platform for success—even
during times with a highly volatile international political climate
and seemingly insurmountable legal obstacles. Perhaps most
noticeably, the ATS used an ecosystem approach at a time when
arms races and military prowess were otherwise higher on the
international agenda. If the mutual goals of peace, science, and
“even” the environment had the power to supersede political,
economic, and military interests, then surely they do now as well.
3. The Science
As shown above, the fact that “the science” behind treaty
developments is difficult, and even controversial at times, is not
a hindrance to eventual treaty success. The telecom agreement,
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the ATS, the Seal Treaty and, in particular, the Montreal
Protocol all involved complex scientific and technical issues, but
still found a common platform on which to stand. In fact, as the
ATS and Montreal Protocol show, scientific motivators often
function as crucial drivers in treaty negotiations and drafting.
C. Negotiation “Champions”
More unknown than the role of national actors, but
perhaps equally important in the treaty drafting process, is the
role played by individual “champions.”70 This oft-forgotten
aspect of treaty-making could beneficially be re-applied in
upcoming climate negotiations. Strong leadership not only by
nations, but also by individuals, is needed in treaty work.71
In the case of the ATS, the work performed by prominent
individuals helped spur action and paved some of the way for
the eventual treaty adoption. Informal talks began when
President Eisenhower issued a letter to the US ambassadors to
all governments taking part in the International Geophysical
Year (“IGY”).72 This letter outlined mutual goals and asserted
that a treaty could be created “without requiring any
participating nation to renounce whatever basic historic rights it
may have” in the region.73 A subsequent gathering at the private
residence of Dr. James Van Allen—a prominent scientist who
played a large role in planning the IGY—prompted the
suggestion of a coordinated international science effort and thus
helped shift focus from contested national claims between
intensely rivaling nations to peaceful international cooperation
for scientific purposes.74 Without the impetus by leaders in both
the scientific and political communities, the treaty may not have
been adopted.

70. See, e.g., Steven Blumenfield, For Science and Peace: The Creation and Evolution
of the Antarctic Treaty System, YALE ECON. REV., Winter/Spring 2010, at 28.
71. See O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 8, 13.
72. See Bulkeley, supra note 66.
73. See U.S. Antarctic Policy=Historical Perspective, NAT’L SCI. FOUND.,
http://www.nsf.gov/geo/plr/antarct/usaphist.jsp (last visited October 30, 2013)
(providing an excerpt from a 1958 statement by US Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles); see also Triggs, supra note 64, at 41.
74. Blumenfield, supra note 70.
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When Japan wanted more than the 25% share of the seal
harvest offered to it in connection with the negotiations leading
up to the Seal Treaty, President Taft sent a direct, personal
appeal to the Emperor of Japan calling for “friendly relations
between the Japanese and American nations” as the
preservation of the seals was “of importance to all the nations of
the world,” which helped ensure Japanese participation.75 At the
time, direct involvement by national leaders in treaty
negotiations was rare, but these examples demonstrate that
personal relations and the structural leadership provided by
world leaders can help move agendas forward. Two
entrepreneurial leaders were key to the Seal Treaty as well,
demonstrating the importance of involving businesses and other
non-governmental
organizations
(“NGOs”)
in
treaty
developments, controversial as that may sound to
environmentalists. In the telecom agreement, the US Secretary
of State intervened at an early stage, which similarly shows the
importance of high-level political pressure by well-known
actors.76
In the Montreal process, United Nations Environment
Programme (“UNEP”) executive director Mostafa Tolba was an
impartial, but important, negotiator.77 In the climate context,
Lord Stern and former British Prime Minister David Cameron
have been mentioned as potential future political champions in
driving the intergovernmental processes forward.78 Lord Stern
has already contributed much to the discourse. Several other
candidates come to mind: Kofi Annan, Al Gore, and Connie
Hedegaard, for example. It does not appear to matter exactly
who is chosen to play this crucial role as long as somebody is
chosen, and as long as that somebody has sufficient clout and
diplomatic skills to influence even very “stubborn” parties.
Non-state actors should also be included, potentially in a
two-step process that starts with an inclusive multi-stakeholder

75. Barrett, supra note 53, at 35.
76. See Ives, supra note 56, at 50.
77. See O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 13.
78. See U.N. FOUND., ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION SUMMARY: SUCCESSFUL
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND LESSONS FOR POST-2015 (2013) [hereinafter
ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION SUMMARY], available at http://www.unfoundation.org/assets/
pdf/post-2015-july.pdf
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conversation, but ends with an intergovernmental agreement.79
Involvement by civil society, including a coalescence of public
interest NGOs and businesses, is understood to be key, especially
in treaty compliance contexts.80
D. Coercion, Secrecy and Other Undemocratic Traits
Perhaps one of the most prevailing aspects of international
legal scholarship is the notion that a new climate treaty should
be negotiated in transparent, fully democratic, and collaborative
ways. Less appealing negotiation techniques are often ignored.
This Section shows how reality often varies from academic ideals
pertaining to treaty developments.
1. Unilaterality and Coercion as Steps Towards Broader
Agreements
Mahatma Gandhi famously said, “Be the change that you
wish to see in the world.” That is, for sure, laudable in the
private context, but unilateral action does not work in the
international context unless also supplemented by at least
bilateral and, most likely, multilateral steps.
The background to the Seal Treaty shows how resources
shared among several nations are prone to overuse when
countries pursue unilateral policies and goals.81 The United
States initially attempted various unilateral technical fixes to
solve the problem. For example, the nation exerted some
“moral leadership” in the area, appealed to international law,
sought diplomatic interventions, petitioned for arbitrations,
attempted unilateral trade restrictions, and even threatened
unilateral military action—all to no avail.82 The United States
even considered moving the threatened seal population from
the ocean to inland lakes to protect it, which presented the
problem that no food was available for the ocean-feeding seals

79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See BARRETT, supra note 53, at 33. However, civil society involvement in
multilateral environmental agreement (“MEA”) negotiation processes can also be
logistically very difficult, as was seen at the Copenhagen COP 15, where this almost got
out of hand.
82. See id. at 33.
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in lakes.83 At one point, the United States even went so far as to
suggest exterminating a certain herd completely out of spite if
Britain refused to cooperate.84 Only a subsequent four-party
agreement solved the problem; not these other attempted types
of statecraft.85 Below, the telecom agreement will show how
unilateral pressures can work, but only in conjunction with
other techniques. In other words, unilateral action and threats
can be instrumental in multilateral contexts, but are not the
determinant factor.86 Information exchange and cooperative
interaction during the negotiation stages are more important.87
If self-motivation at the national level does not occur and
unilateral action does not suffice, can some international “stick”
be applied to drive recalcitrant parties towards agreement? As
shown by the telecom agreement, perhaps such a “stick” would
suffice, although coercion is more likely to work in tandem with
multilateral track diplomacy.
Before the telecom agreement, the United States
threatened Japan with bilateral trade sanctions in direct contrast
to multilateral policies against limited reciprocity.88 The US
Trade Representative (“USTR”) exerted pressure on Japan.89
Section 301 petitions under the Trade Act of 197490 were used as
a negotiation weapon.91 As an additional threat, a draft
telecommunications access bill was proposed that would have
used
Federal
Communications
Commission
(“FCC”)
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Ives, supra note 56, at 60.
87. See id. at 60.
88. See id. at 50.
89. See id. at 49.
90. Trade Act of 1974 Pub. L. No. 93-619 § 301, 88 Stat. 1978-2, 19 U.S.C. § 2411
(2012) (authorizing the President to take all appropriate action, including retaliation,
to obtain the removal of any act, policy, or practice of a foreign government that
violates an international trade agreement or is unjustified, unreasonable, or
discriminatory, and that burdens or restricts U.S. commerce). Section 301 cases can be
self-initiated by the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) or as the result of a
petition filed by a firm or industry group. If the USTR initiates a Section 301
investigation, it must seek to negotiate a settlement with the foreign country in the
form of compensation or elimination of the trade barrier. For cases involving trade
agreements, the USTR is required to request formal dispute proceedings as provided
by the trade agreements. See id.
91. Ives, supra note 56, at 51.
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certification procedures to slow or prohibit imports from
foreign countries that did not open their markets to US
telecommunications products or services.92 The FCC proposed
to introduce legislation calling for minimum pricing
benchmarks based on narrow reciprocity.93 In other words, the
United States openly sought to punish “unfair traders” within
the telecommunications sector.94 The discourse was often
adversarial as opposed to collaborative.95 The ultimate
agreement reached was thus not negotiated through inclusive,
democratic and politically correct means. Arguably, the United
States more or less “bullied” Japan into compliance. Japan
correctly perceived the process as coercive, which seriously
damaged the US-Japanese relationship.96 Japan further
lamented that it alone had to compromise, not the United
States.97 However, the mix of coercion with some positive
interaction and persuasion in relation to the monetary benefits
that Japan stood to gain through an agreement eventually led
Japan away from only trying to avoid possible losses by being
named under Section 301, and towards the ultimate
agreement.98 More collaboratively, in 1995 the G7 dedicated a
meeting to the topic which helped share the core consensus and
ensure support from the broader WTO process, albeit again
with warnings from the USTR. A crucial “interest redefinition”
happened when Japan came to see trade liberalization as being
in its own national economic interest.99 Thus, coercion may have
only worked in conjunction with the broader positive incentives.
The final WTO agreements were reached in more
democratically appealing ways, but, even so, the talks under that
framework were, first and foremost, designed to satisfy the
underlying needs and interests of the dominant players, not all
the players.100 There was an “inner circle” that harmonized its
members’ policies while countries on the outskirts of the circle
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See S. 492, 86th Cong.; see also Ives, supra note 56, at 51.
See Ives, supra note 56, at 63.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 54.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 54.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 61.
See id.
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spent time catching up.101 This not only shows a degree of
undemocratic egotism or nationalist economic interests at play,
but it also the possibility of narrower agreements broadening
when secondary actors are coaxed into moving along with other
nations. Thus, in the telecom agreement, a double strategy was
used wherein coercive threats were used in conjunction with
multilateral track diplomacy.102 This interplay between
cooperative processes and coercive pressure was paramount in
inducing change at that time,103 and it may be with climate
change now.
Coercion was particularly effective because of the highly
technical nature of the telecommunications problem.104 Because
climate change is just as technically complex, if not more, less
democracy and more “old-fashioned” diplomatic coercion may
thus also be fruitful in egging some parties along.
In contrast, pure coercion appears unlikely to function well
as an exclusive negotiation tactic. There is a demonstrated link
between use of coercive tactics and instability of outcomes.105
Over time, coercion leads to a breakdown in relationships.106
Coercion is more likely to be tolerated if the underlying
relationship is strong or if state behavior demonstrates
willingness to improve the relationship.107 Currently, the USSino relationship, for example, is very likely not strong enough
to support any attempted “coercion” in the climate context no
matter the degree of such pressure. The relationship seems to
rest on a very delicate platform. Just as cautious optimism for a
climate agreement between the two parties seems warranted, the
ebb and flow of this relationship changes, thus making any US
attempts to convince China to adopt binding agreements seem
futile. Other national actors may be more open towards
diplomatic pressure than China.
At bottom, the success of coercive tactics is contingent
upon channeling negotiations into broader, more collaborative

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See id.
See id. at 63.
See id. at 64.
See id. at 71.
See id. at 69.
See id.
See id.
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contexts. To be successful, difficult international talks should be
progressively multilateralized.
2. Secrecy and Early Examples of Exclusion
In the case of the ATS, the US Department of State initially
issued a secret policy paper seeking to eliminate international
disputes over the territory, preserve the continent for science,
and protect US interests.108 Initially, the United States was
predominantly interested in denying access to the area to
potential enemies—such as the USSR—and to prevent Soviet
influence over it.109 The State Department’s review of US policy
led to bilateral talks with Great Britain about options for the
desirable level of “internationalization” of the continent.110
These talks were only later widened to include six other
governments with territorial claims in Antarctica and,
subsequently, other governments with IGY committees running
stations on the continent.111 Initially, the USSR was thus not a
party to the talks, but was included in a cartel outside the UN
architecture.112 India, Brazil, Uruguay, and Peru were also
excluded from initial negotiations.113 The USSR conducted itself
in a positive, open-minded manner throughout the
international discussions, as the nation wanted inclusion into,
not exclusion from, the ATS.114 Later, when the USSR was
included in plans for a possible international solution, the
United States and the USSR conducted no less than sixty secret
meetings in preparation for the treaty.115 At one stage of the
negotiations, the parties reached a “gentlemen’s agreement”
under which the negotiating governments agreed not to
“engage in legal or political argumentation” over Antarctic
sovereignty issues during the IGY.116 Although a seemingly small
aspect of the overall agreement, it at least shows how parties may
agree on a period of “truce” in otherwise deadlocked political
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Triggs, supra note 64, at 41.
See Bulkeley, supra note 66.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Triggs, supra note 64, at 41.
See Bulkeley, supra note 66.
See id.
See Triggs, supra note 64, at 42.
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discussions when something else is perceived to be a higher
priority on the international agenda. This is arguably the
current case with the climate change crisis, where scientific
reality must, or, for the lack of a better word, should, be seen to
override political and economic difficulties.
The above shows how undemocratic treaty negotiations can
be and probably often are. For example, secret papers are
circulated among key participants. Exclusive clubs are formed.
Such club formation is not unknown at the supranational scene
either—some nations reach behind-the-scenes agreements in
phases and with a limited range of participants, at least to begin
with. To a very large extent, these shape the ultimate agreement
whether or not all nations “like” this process and the resulting
outcomes. In fact, true broad consensus is rare. Nations do not
deal with each other exclusively, but rather seek to promote
their own interests by negotiating faceted agreements into place
with others before reaching an ultimate supranational
agreement. Yet despite such seemingly undemocratic facets of
international law-making, nations eventually do find reasons to
join the adopted schemes and coalitions. This also goes for
organizations such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) and the groups of major
economies such as the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and
Central Bank Governors (“G20”). Even as regards to the
otherwise quite inclusion-seeking (and “politically correct”)
European Union, it has become known that Turkey simply is not
a desirable member, and likely will not be for a long time to
come. Shameful, perhaps, but the reality is that from
kindergartens to international forums, political coalitions arise
and agreements are made in ways that are not necessarily
democratic. The crucial matter, however, is that substantively
desirable goals can be reached even through procedurally
questionable actions. Perhaps the end justifies the means, at
least when it comes to climate change. The world has become so
used to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol resting on solid
“cosmopolitan democratic”117 principles and near-universal
participation that it might, at first glance, be difficult to imagine
alternatives. But they do exist, even under the United Nations
117.

McGee, supra note 13, at 7.
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auspices. For example, the UN Security Council also does not
employ a broadly democratic process: only the five permanent
members have veto power over substantive resolutions. The ten
additional rotating non-permanent members do not. In all,
fifteen Security Council members vote on matters that could
affect no less than 193 nations; the total membership of the
United Nations. True democracy is, of course, the ideal, but in
the climate context, it is arguably less important over the next
few months and years than reaching a substantively effective
solution. Procedural fairness could then be improved.
E. Bilaterality and Progressive Multilateralism
The call for the participation of “all major emitters” in a
new climate treaty still permeates the international climate
discourse. This Article posits that as few as two parties can kick
start a new international agreement. International law
precedent supports this argument as follows.
During the initial stages of the development of the United
States-Japan telecommunications agreement, “key states . . .
migrate[d] away from the multilateralism of the [International
Telecommunication Union] towards ‘more effective’ and ‘less
time consuming’ bilateral and plurilateral channels.”118 After
several high-level bilateral meetings and much pressure, Japan
responded affirmatively to all points demanded of it.119 The
United States also worked with Canada, several European
nations, Brazil, and India to eventually reach a broader
international impact in the telecommunications industry, but at
first sought to achieve this in a bilateral manner.120 When
nations were egged along by the general trend of
internationalization in telecommunications and, further, came
to realize that what had first been seen as problems actually
represented inherent gains for national industry players, the
agreements that started out as sets of bilateral agreements
between the United States and the above parties became topics
for further expansion under the auspices of the OECD.121 At
118. Ives, supra note 56, at 47.
119. Id. at 51.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 55, 57.
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first, four difficult impasse points were discussed at length within
the relatively small OECD forum until virtual consensus had
been achieved.122 Only then were negotiations displaced by the
broader, binding, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”)/WTO forum.123 Multilateral talks at the WTO level
only arose after a core consensus had been developed via, first,
unilateral action in the form of the United States coercing Japan
to agree or face sanctions, then tough bilateral negotiations and
information exchanges, and further broadened international
negotiations at the OECD level.124 Under the WTO auspices, the
“Reference Paper” was eventually developed.125 This is a
framework of pro-competitive regulatory policies that is not
legally binding in and of itself, but becomes binding with
additional commitments by the parties.126
The above procedures show how high-level national interest
in the United States can lead other key actors into adopting an
integral and crucial bilateral agreement which, crucially in the
climate context, can lead to much broader and deeper binding
multilateral action under an already existing architecture. When
the United States has both the economic interest and the
political will, it can be the instigator of action at the
international level. Bilaterality is still common in the trade
context. For example, in the GATT/WTO context, legal
frameworks are often translated into binding commitments via
breakout bilateral treaties among individual states.127
Another example of how broader international agreements
can be reached from a very narrow starting point is the WTO
schedules. The WTO operates with a set of general rules that
apply to all members, but also specific commitments
(“schedules”) initially made by individual member
governments.128 All WTO members have a schedule of
122. Id. at 58.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 47.
125. See Nakatika, supra note 55, at 3.
126. Id. at 4.
127. See Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of
International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 370 (2008).
128. See Goods Schedules, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_schedules_e.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) [hereinafter
WTO Goods Schedules].

2014]

THE "MAGIC NUMBER" IS THREE

403

concessions that reflect specific tariff concessions and other
commitments that nations have agreed to in the context of trade
negotiations such as the Uruguay Round.129 The schedules
record commitments to progressively remove barriers to the
international trade in goods and services, and serve as a starting
point for future trade negotiations.130 The content of the
schedules change over time to take account of different
modifications, such as GATT Article XXVIII negotiations or
rectification procedures.131 Each individual WTO member
schedule is an agreement among all members, and no changes
can be introduced without the approval of all members.132
In contrast, the Seal Treaty development process shows how
bilateral agreements may not work well when there is a risk of
“leakage,” as there is with climate change. In an arbitration
agreement between the United States and Great Britain on
behalf of Canada, the WTO tribunal had held for Britain and
limited the United States jurisdiction to hunt seals to only three
miles from shore.133 This ruling was observed, but circumvented
by sealers moving to other areas of the ocean, by United States
(and Great Britain) sealers flying the flag of other nations in
order to continue sealing, and by other entrants on the sealing
scene, such as Japan, who were not affected by the arbitration
ruling.134 It became clear then, as it might be with climate
change now, that a comprehensive agreement covering all the
major powers in the area was needed.135 Nonetheless, the Seal
Treaty still shows that even though major powers may be needed
for eventual successful treaty developments, bilateral talks can
lead to broader legal regimes. The Seal Treaty process quickly
grew from two to five nations in the closing treaty stages; enough
to secure a substantive success (the affected seal herd, almost

129. See id.
130. ARUNABHA GHOSH, CENTER. FOR POLICY RESEARCH, MAKING CLIMATE LOOK
LIKE TRADE? QUESTIONS ON INCENTIVES, FLEXIBILITY AND CREDIBILITY (2010), available
at
http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/CPR%20Climate%
20Brief_March%202010_1.pdf.
131. See WTO Goods Schedules, supra note 128.
132. See GHOSH, supra note 130.
133. See BARRETT, supra note 53, at 28.
134. Id. at 29–30.
135. Id. at 29.
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extinguished, grew to two million not many years later).136 The
Seal Treaty also shows that a very large number of nations need
not be involved in a treaty for it to be successful. The crux is
typically whether the parties with a major economic interest at
stake come to an agreement.
In short, bilaterality may well prove conducive, at least
initially, in the climate change context. Two parties will probably
not have the sufficient substantive effect on an eventual
resolution of the underlying climate change problem, but as has
been demonstrated, two key players can pave the way for a
subsequent sufficiently broad treaty participation. “[B]ilateral
teeth and multilateral intellect” are key in international law
formation.137 Such progressive multilateralism was also seen in
the case of the ATS, which started with twelve parties but
increased
to
forty-six.
Similarly,
economic/political
organizations such as the G20, and even the European Union
also started relatively small. For example, the European Union
began with narrow agreements on steel and coal among six
nations. It is now arguably one of the most successful
international governance examples in the world with twentyeight member nations in Europe and much influence on
international affairs such as, in particular, climate change.
Treaty development is all about the “process, not just a piece of
paper.”138
As has been seen in the climate change context, attempting
to bring everyone to the table too early and incorporating too
many and too diverse interests destroys whatever negotiating
momentum may otherwise have been built up, especially when
addressing highly technical problems. Instead, taking a step
back, starting with key bilateral agreements and gradually
building up momentum is more effective. Together, bi- and
multilaterality make up a “single negotiation space,” but one
approach may not work without the other. To be sure, time has
almost run out for very limited approaches, but, on the other
hand, there may also not be time not to try this approach. They

136. See id. at 32.
137. Ives, supra note 56, at 71.
138. See Triggs, supra note 64, at 48.
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may well prove effective in the climate context as they have in
other areas the past.
F. Club Formation
One of the perhaps most prevalent premises promoted in
climate discourse is the notion that a new treaty must be highly
inclusive for reasons of procedural fairness and general
democracy. This premise is proving dated or even outright false.
While many legal scholars still refer to “all” major emitters, this
notion denotes the ideal of international inclusiveness that has
proved unrealistic so far. Respectfully, this Article argues that
these notions have proved so unpragmatic that they now more
closely align with idealistic academic myths than on-the-ground
reality in the climate treaty formulation contexts. This Section
will analyze the advantages and criticisms pertaining to what has
become known as “minilateralism” and set forth some examples
of successful narrow national negotiation constellations work to
show that minilateralism works in reality.
As a threshold matter, “multilateralism” denotes the
creation of international bodies, agreements, and rules through
negotiation by the states that will be also subject to the
arrangements in question and who agree to be bound by the
arrangements.139 “Inclusive” multilateralism happens when
NGOs are also involved in the discourse140 or simply when an
extensive number of nations form part of the debate. In
contrast, “minilateralism” denotes seeking a “magic number” of
key states with enough influence upon an issue to craft smaller,
responsive
international
institutions.141
“Exclusive”
minilateralism takes place when excluding irrelevant parties and
all NGO involvement.142 In the climate context, for example,
exclusive minilateralism would come about by excluding the 175
or so nations with the least GHG emissions.143
In general, typical criticisms of exclusive minilateralism
include the arguments that such processes are self-serving, break

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See McGee, supra note 13, at 8.
See id. at 11.
See id. at 11–12; Naim, supra note 12.
See McGee, supra note 13, at 12.
See id.
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ethical principles of due process, directly contest the
cosmopolitan democratic version of liberal multilateralism and
“all inclusiveness,” and thus lack legitimacy within the
international society.144 Openly excluding NGOs from processes
is contra to the democratic ideal that promotes the voice of nonstate actors for accountability and aggregation of interest
purposes.145 With climate change in particular, due process
concerns arise when the most vulnerable nations are excluded
from the democratic process that would greatly affect them.146
The stand-off between top emitters would allegedly be the same
in small forums as in big ones,147 so the argument is that
negotiators may just as well continue with large-scale multilateral
negotiations even though they stopped yielding effective results
about two decades ago,148 incidentally with the creation of the
UNFCCC and the WTO. Further, smaller groupings are thought
to bring with them the risk that economically powerful states
acting more or less alone will redefine the problem and accept
lower levels of ambition than what is actually needed.149
Parades of horribles such as these are far from unknown in
the legal field, and thankfully often prove unwarranted. As
reality shows, a continued stalemate is more likely to happen
with the continued use of the same broad constellation. The
“stand-off” between some emitters could be avoided by smaller
cooperative forums that, quite simply, excluded disinterested
nations to begin with. As treaty history shows, this step may in
itself provide sufficient international “jealousy” to motivate
them to join the regime in secondary steps. Alternatively, if
sufficient economic motivators were developed and made
available to a certain range of parties, this too could break the
stalemate in small and large forums. The broader concerns
regarding due process and ethics are, of course, very valid, but it
is not the first time in history that they have been brought up
and initially set aside in order to reach agreements on crucial

144. See id. at 12–13, 22.
145. See id. at 22.
146. See id. at 12.
147. Robyn Eckersley, Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or
Minilateralism?, 12 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2012, at 35.
148. See Naim, supra note 12.
149. See McGee, supra note 13, at 23.
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matters, as shown above. In regards to climate change,
procedural problems are better than substantive stalemate. We
need a quite different perspective than ever before. “An
approach based on agreements or partnerships between
individual nations, groups of countries and regions makes more
sense—and could eventually strengthen more universal
measures.”150
In fact, minilateral forums are already used in UNFCCC
contexts, as was most recently demonstrated in connection with
the Copenhagen Conference of Parties 15 (“COP 15”). In an
attempt to take advantage of its Presidency and become an
agenda-setting leader, Denmark broke ranks with the traditional
negotiating parties and, instead, focused its efforts on a group of
nations known as “the circle of commitment,” which was
understood to include the United Kingdom, United States, and
Denmark.151 Discussions were held among these parties outside
the UNFCCC preparatory meetings in order to garner support
for the “Danish text.”152 This proposed text would have
abandoned the Kyoto Protocol, weakened the United Nation’s
role in handling climate finance by handing effective control of
climate change finance to the World Bank, made any money to
help poor countries adapt to climate change dependent on
them taking a range of actions, forced developing countries to
agree to specific emission cuts and measures that were not part
of the original UN agreement, and divided poor countries
further by creating a new official category of developing
countries called “the most vulnerable.”153 In addition, Denmark
also organized bilateral meetings with, among others, the
European Union, Australia, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, China, and
India, and a multilateral, confidential meeting between twenty
to thirty countries to advocate for its position prior to the COP
15.154 However, the Danish text was ultimately leaked to the

150. McGee, supra note 13, at 12 (citing to prominent UK sociologist Anthony
Giddens).
151. John Vidal, Copenhagen Climate Summit in Disarray After ‘Danish Text’ Leak,
GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-summit-disarray-danish-text.
152. See id.; see also McGee, supra note 13, at 20.
153. See Vidal, supra note 151.
154. See McGee, supra note 13, at 20.
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Guardian,155 which alienated the vast majority of the states that
had been unaware of the existence of the text.156 The Group of
77 (“G77”) plus China denounced it as “undemocratic, unfair
and . . . lack[ing] . . . transparency.”157 No agreement was
ever reached on the text. Instead, on the Friday before the
closure of the COP, the leaders of five nations (the United
States, China, India, South Africa, and Brazil) met in private to
draft the modest three-page Copenhagen Accord.158 The text of
this proposed agreement was presented to a group of twenty-six
countries that had also tried to create an agreement for
consensus during the last few days of the COP.159 Consensus on
support for the Accord was reached by these twenty-six nations.
However, the Copenhagen Accord was ultimately rejected by
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Sudan, and Tuvalu, a rejection
that was possible because UNFCCC agreements require full
consensus.160 The Accord was thus only “noted” rather than
“adopted,”161 although, importantly, subsequent consensus on
the main aspects of the Accord was reached only one year later
at the COP 16 in Cancun.162
The Copenhagen process shows that breakouts are on the
way within the UNFCCC. Although the Accord cannot be said to
have had a huge ultimate effect, it was at least a beginning and
was an indicator of the potential for climate clubs. Noticeably,
the Accord took its start in confidential agreements among just
five nations, became further empowered by a group of twentysix, and was adopted a year later by approximately 142

155. See Vidal, supra note 151.
156. McGee, supra note 13, at 20.
157. Id. (quoting Per Meilstrup, The Runway Summit: The Background Story of the
Danish Presidency of COP 15, in DANISH FOREIGN POLICY YEARBOOK 128 (2010), available
at http://subweb.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Books2010/YB2010/YB2010-Runawaysummit_WEB.pdf).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 21.
161. See Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen, Den. Dec. 719, 2009, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1.
162. Compare id., with Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancún, Nov.
29-Dec. 10, 2010, Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1.
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nations.163 There is thus strong evidence of the willingness of key
states to marginalize the open development of texts through the
UNFCCC meetings and instead employ minilateral discourse
forums.164
Outside the UNFCCC context, but within MEAs, club
formation is common too. For example, the Asia-Pacific
Partnership (“APP”), intended to complement, but not replace,
the Kyoto Protocol work, commenced with six original nations
(China, India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the United
States) and has since added two (New Zealand and Canada).165
The United States Major Emitters and Energy Consumers
Process (“MEP”) was established to build on US relations within
the APP and initially consisted of the world’s top fifteen GHG
economies and polluters.166 These nations were to develop longterm global goals “based on national circumstances” with the
goals to be determined by each state individually.167 Thus, clubs
exist even within clubs. The forum, re-badged by the Obama
Administration as the Major Economies Forum on Energy and
Climate (“MEF”) in 2009, comprises seventeen nations. Perhaps
most promising is the fact that the Montreal Protocol was led by
three major coalitions: one led by the United States that favored
a deep agreement, a group comprised of the then-European
Community and Japan, and a coalition of developing countries
that shared concerns about potential economic impacts.168
Outside the MEA context, clubs have been formed for a
long time as well, and with much success. An example is what is
now the European Union. The current twenty-eight members
grouped and integrated at different rates. Even currently, the
European Union allows for agreements among only some
members. For example, not all members use the euro; Denmark

163.
ON

McGee, supra note 13, at 21; Copenhagen Accord, FRAMEWORK CONVENTION
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/
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5262.php.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 15–16.
166. Id. at 17.
167. Id. at 17–18 (citing Press Release, The Whitehouse, Fact Sheet: A New
International Climate Change Framework (May 31, 2007) available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/05/2007053113.html).
168. See O’BRIEN & GOWEN, supra note 15, at 13.
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and the United Kingdom have opted out. Denmark also opted
out of the common EU defense policy.169 Under the Schengen
Agreement (which initially was adopted independently of the
European Union), most EU members and a few non-EU
members have abolished border controls.
In international financial law, club formation takes
precedent in both legally binding and non-binding agreements.
For example, the WTO has provisions for plurilateral
agreements that allow small groups of countries to proceed with
a more limited agreement than others.170 But the WTO also
employs non-exclusive principles; discussions leading up to
these agreements may involve non-members as well as members,
just as membership is open to non-members.171 Likewise, the
WTO’s “Most Favored Nation” principle started as an
agreement among a relatively exclusive club, but now extends to
all members.172 Accordingly, the WTO is, on the one hand, a
very broadly democratic organization, but on the other hand,
also features intrinsic club-formation, or at least narrower
regime constellations in relation to some issues when needed.
Much could be learned from that in the climate regime.
On the non-binding end of the spectrum, initial
multilateral talks within the OECD may also not have been as
integrative as some prevailing existing theories may suggest.173
There too were the issues defined and influenced by dominant
players.174 And the various groups of major economies, such as
the G8, G8+5, and currently the G20, are also by definition
exclusive clubs, although they are not driven by internal
coalitions, but rather reach agreement by all members through
flexibility, which is key to these groups’ work.
In short, a small club of key emitters could transform the
credibility of climate actions and provide a new effective
alternative to what has been seen as the problem of treaty law,
169. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/
FTU_6.1.3.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
170. GHOSH, supra note 130, at 3.
171. Id.
172. Understanding the WTO: The Basics—Principles of the Trading System, WORLD
TRADE ORG, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last
visited Aug. 4, 2013).
173. Ives, supra note 56, at 59.
174. Id.
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namely that treaties become the “‘law of the least ambitious
program . . .’ and codify the interests of laggards.”175
In contrast, the development of the Seal Treaty
demonstrates the benefits that derive from inclusive and, to
perhaps a smaller extent, symmetrical bargaining. Each of the
four major sealing parties to the negotiations was recognized as
a Great Power, which created some symmetry in the distribution
of power.176 Unilateral attempts by each state to take advantage
of the situation (and, for example, exterminate entire herds of
seals out of spite just to prevent other nations from benefiting
from the resource) were met with strong responses. In other
words, the inclusivity meant that the parties were able to keep
each other in check, although doing so created a very tense
situation that persisted for decades,177 not unlike the current
climate change situation. However, the symmetric bargaining
cannot fully account for the success, as the military powers had
also begun to shift at the time.178 Perhaps the somewhat equal
economic status among the parties was more important. But
with the shift of military status came the resolution of the seal
issue,179 which may bode well for the development of a new
climate regime complex as China is rising in both economic and
thus also military power. Shifts in the balance of power at
negotiation tables can allow for decisions and outcomes that
might otherwise have been impossible.180 Similarly, changing
specific parties in international negotiations either by expansion
or reduction of the pool of negotiating parties can cause shifts
in the balance of power181 that may help pave the way towards a
new agreement. Thus, a reduction of the number of participants
in the climate change negotiations in clubs or via “tracks” or

175. See David Victor, Toward Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change:
Numbers, Interests and Institutions, 6 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Aug. 2006, at 90 (quoting
ARILD UNDERDAL, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: THE CASE
OF THE NORTHEAST ATLANTIC 36 (1980)).
176. See Mirovitskaya, supra note 16, at 36–37.
177. Id.
178. Mirovitskaya, supra note 16 at 37.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 37–38.
181. Id.
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“tiers” may well help break the hopeless stalemate of recent
years.182 This will be further developed in the next Section.
G. Tiers, Tracks, and Other Fairness Concerns
Instead of one major agreement with limited differentiation
of party obligations among a few tracks of parties, such as the
design of the first Kyoto Protocol architecture, recent climate
discourse points to the possibility that a new agreement may well
have to feature several more layers of obligations. This Section
will highlight the existing regime and possibilities for its future
development
1. CBDR
Treaties considered successful by experts reflect notions of
fairness such as the principle of “common but differentiated
responsibilities” (“CBDR”) in MEA contexts.183 This principle
has been promoted in environmental contexts since its
inception as part of Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development. The Montreal Protocol
featured exact but differentiated plans for compliance.184
Developing nations faced looser restrictions and received
economic assistance.185 The principle was most recently invoked
by the 2009 Copenhagen UNFCCC COP. But the amount of
differentiation spelled out in the two related instruments
(“Annex I” and “Annex II” countries under the UNFCC
umbrella as well as “Annex B” and “non-Annex I” countries
together with the resulting legal and financial obligations under
the Kyoto Protocol) is no longer considered to give sufficient
guidance to inform the parties of exactly what is required of
them.186 More obligation divergence is needed to secure a new,
fair treaty. The largest emitters must accept that they will likely
have to show sincere efforts to reduce their emissions to what
may be seen as a disproportionately greater extent than
182. For a discussion of how the Seal Treaty succeeded by changing the rules of
the game by restructuring the relationships among the countries, see BARRETT, supra
note 53, at 33–39.
183. O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 11
184. Id. at 14–15.
185. Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1690–91.
186. O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 14.
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developing countries and to share technologies to help the
latter.187
Of course, notions of what is “fair” differ widely and
depend on the point of view from which one approaches this
topic. For example, the United States has so far rejected a
climate agreement because, at bottom, American negotiators
have not considered it “fair” that developing nations such as
China and India have not also had to take on legally binding
targets. In turn, China and India have taken the stance that
because their per capita emissions are much lower than those in
North America, they should not have to be bound to total
emissions targets. The elephant in the room is that the SinoIndian notion may not be so “unfair” after all.188 To reach a
supranational agreement in a timely fashion, the United States
may just have to swallow its diplomatic pride, set aside its own
previous hard stance on this topic, and instead reconsider
whether it would make more overall sense to display a more
flexible attitude towards the attempts of China and other rapidly
emerging countries in reaching overall reductions as well as per
capita goals. Principles from the Asia-Pacific Partnership context
demonstrate that much trust may be gained among negotiators
if members of a group of large emitters showed sincere efforts to
reduce emissions unilaterally first, especially if some nations
showed a greater willingness to share technologies and provide
economic support for the adoption of new technologies in
poorer member nations.189 It is well established that economic,
technical, and information-sharing mechanisms to facilitate
compliance in developing countries are a trademark of good
international agreements.190 On the other hand, a common fear
in this context is that less economically able nations simply seek
to increase their technological prowess “for free” without
actually reducing their carbon footprints. Further, China’s
economic growth is, for example, more than double the world’s
average191 and as China stands to become the largest economy in

187. See id. at 3–4.
188. Id. at 11.
189. GHOSH, supra note 130 at 2.
190. O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15 at 13.
191. Sunstein, supra note 24 at 1687.
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the world within this decade,192 the question becomes if China is
or will remain a country that should receive help and how much.
That question, however, is outside the scope of this Article.
It may be that the creation of a single, relatively uniform
treaty text for negotiation reduces the degree of complexity and,
thus, at least in theory, makes it more likely that a greater
number of nations will become willing to adopt the text
compared to treaties that feature a greater amount of flexible
arrangements. However, single texts are known to result in the
least common denominator being chosen and reducing the
opportunities for creativity in shaping the central problem.193 In
a worst-case scenario, a single uniform text does not reflect the
central problem at all or the desires of the majority of potential
participants.194 This became reality with the Kyoto Protocol, the
first version of which was valid until late 2012, but only called for
approximately 5% emissions reductions even towards the end of
the first commitment period when it had become known that
much deeper cuts were needed. Accordingly, more multifaceted agreements are more likely to result in substantively
better results, especially if nations can form clubs in negotiating
such tiered agreements.
2. Tiers and Tracks
Tiered solutions have proven effective in both
environmental and non-environmental contexts. The ATS, for
example, was initially developed as one overall treaty governing
the territorial and general usage claims, with separate treaties
for seals, krill, and other living resources adopted afterwards in a
step-by-step approach featuring separate tracks for the involved
nations.195 In the creation of the WTO, talks often deadlocked,
but when the trade-in-services discussions were moved to a
separate negotiation track, the deadlock was resolved196 and, as
the saying goes, the rest is history. In the US-Japanese telecom
agreement, the United States wanted a “critical mass” of
options, from either a quantity or a quality point of view, to
192. AL GORE, THE FUTURE: SIX DRIVERS OF GLOBAL CHANGE 93 (2013).
193. Ives, supra note 56, at 60.
194. Id. at 60.
195. Triggs, supra note 64, at 44.
196. See Ives, supra note 56, at 62.
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choose from.197 The result was a tiered agreement. “Tier One”
nations were required to fulfill 100% of their respective market
opening commitments (the United States, European Union,
Canada, and Japan “quad,” plus Switzerland, Singapore, Hong
Kong, Brazil, India, and Korea).198 “Tier Two” consisted of
advanced developing countries (ASEAN, the “Big Latins,” and
South Africa), who would have to satisfy existing regimes and
commit to future market opening within reasonable
timeframes.199 “Tier Three” comprised all remaining countries,
who would be asked to bind their current regimes.200 In this way,
the desired critical mass was achieved, although less than seventy
states were signatories to the resulting agreement.201 Ninety
percent of the telecommunications market was covered by the
agreement, which led the United States to commit to open its
market on a most favored nation basis.202 This shows that
substantively successful agreements can be reached without the
extremely broad consensus sought so far under the UNFCCC
auspices, as long as a certain minimum number of key nations
form a part.
The tiered approach already applies to some MEAs such as
the United States-Canada Quality Agreement and the Longrange Transboundary Air Pollution Regime.203 The latter has
separate protocols on separate substances such as sulfur dioxide,
mono-nitrogen oxides, and heavy metals.204 Track solutions
might be possible in a renewed climate change regime. In fact,
the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol already feature both de jure
and de facto tracks205: de jure, these frameworks already
reference Annex I, non-Annex I, and Annex II solutions; de
facto, parties have taken technology-based initiatives, made
subnational commitments and initiated much other cooperation
outside the UNFCCC/Kyoto context. Future tracks or tiers
197. Id. at 65.
198. Id. at 65–66.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 66.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. DANIEL BODANSKY & ELLIOT DIRINGER, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE, TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED MULTI-TRACK CLIMATE FRAMEWORK 8, 11 (2007).
204. Id. at 8.
205. Id. at 6.
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could consist of a host of different commitments such as
completely
individualized
commitments,
integrated
commitments with a limited number of tracks and requirements
as to which nations could negotiate within which tracks, a
variable approach including both legally binding and nonlegally binding targets, or economy-wide vs. sector-wide
commitments.206 A “menu” approach has also been suggested,
under which nations are limited to a choice of options from a
collectively agreed-upon menu.207 Finally, a “mixed approach”
would define some commitments collectively via a top-down
supranational approach, but letting nations define others by
themselves in a bottom-up fashion.208 At bottom, it is clear that
the major economies are more apt to engage in an international
effort if given latitude to pursue different policy tracks.209 For
example, “Todd Stern, U.S. special envoy for climate change,
said the U.S. position of having nations offer up their own
‘nationally determined mitigation commitments’ – one that was
greeted with some skepticism at the 2009 Copenhagen summit –
has now become accepted wisdom among key blocs from China
to the European Union.”210
The view that a new climate treaty must be able to
accommodate a greater degree of changes without having to
renegotiate the treaty in a few years is supported by Christiana
Figueres, executive secretary of the UNFCCC: “there is no
appetite to renegotiate yet another agreement in two [to] five
years . . . . What the governments want is something they can
add on to, in sort of a modular fashion, as time moves on.”211
Whether the diversity of obligation required is called club
formation, tiers, tracks, or something else, it is clear that the
time has come to utilize negotiation techniques that allow for
much greater diversity and flexibility than what has been used
under the UNFCCC so far. And whatever obligations are
adopted, they must be legally binding in order to be successful;

206. Id. at 13, 17, 20.
207. Id. at 12.
208. Id. at 13.
209. Id. at 1.
210. Dean Scott, U.S. Envoy Touts Evolution in Climate Talks to Broad Acceptance of
Pledge-based Accord, INT’L ENV’T. REP. (BNA) (November 18, 2013).
211. Kessler, supra note 7.
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merely drafting treaties means little on-the-ground improvement
without binding effect and enforcement options.212 Although a
legally binding solution is arguably key to climate change in
order to be able to provide sufficiently serious deterrents to this
increasingly severe factual problem, non-binding agreements
can similarly play an important complementary role in the initial
stages of treaty drafting.213 Such agreement would not work as
much as leaders of action but as codifiers214: “International
cooperation emerges through ambitious commitments, efforts
and experiments that are undertaken more readily when
agreements are nonbinding. Through these experiments,
governments gain confidence . . . and then become more
willing to embrace binding commitments.”215 For example, the
European acid rain regime was adopted alongside a binding
convention.216 The US-Japanese telecom agreement process also
shows that alternative forums are valuable to eventual binding
results. Human rights treaties demonstrate this: numerous
nations around the world have adopted a wide range of such
instruments, yet continue their flagrant violations thereof. It
may be advantageous for nations to accede to various treaties
from a publicity standpoint, but without legal “teeth,” a treaty
does not guarantee any actual action. And in order to avoid a
race to the bottom in the MEA context, a climate treaty must
require that more be done to protect the environment than states
would otherwise be inclined to do.217
Creating a treaty is a difficult art and science. The above
demonstrates some of the most important factors that come into
play when nations attempt to do so. The next Section will
analyze who should do so.
II. MINILATERAL CONSTELLATIONS IN THE CLIMATE
CHANGE REGIME COMPLEX; THE “WHO”
Recent scholarship proposes that a new climate change
agreement is likely to be created by a much narrower
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Cairncross, supra note 41; O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 14.
Victor, supra note 175, at 98.
Id. at 100.
Id.
Id. at 98.
Cairncross, supra note 41.
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constellation of parties than previously envisioned, although
most writers continue to promote the inclusion of “all” major
emitters. Typical suggestions range from twelve to twenty parties.
Why do many scholars and policymakers now seem to agree that
not all or even most nations around the world are needed for a
successful new climate treaty when the UNFCCC and the Kyoto
Protocol comprised almost two hundred nations? The answer is
that because most emissions are created by a relatively low
number of nations, only a minority of nations is needed for
substantive success. As one leading analyst said, “it is better to
focus on [the twenty largest] emitters, the other 150 countries
only get in the way.”218
This Section first examines recent proposals for actiontaking clubs. The Article analyzes who that is and what these
nations themselves indicate about their possible intent to take
action (or the lack thereof). The Section then critically
examines which nations are the most realistic candidates for a
renewed climate change regime complex constellation.
A. Frequently Proposed Constellations
The smallest number proposed for a renewed climate
regime is three: the United States, the European Union, and
China.219 Each of these is responsible for a high proportion of
global carbon emissions (at least 12%) and of global GDP.220
Together, they represent half of the global GDP and 49% of
global carbon emissions.221 Because they also possess important
technological and human capital for decarbonizing the
economy, in addition to relatively solid finances, these nations
are seen as particularly important players.222 In fact, they are
arguably so important to the climate context that they could
constitute a successful constellation by themselves—if not
substantively, then at least to spur further nations to join the
club or emulate its action.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

McGee, supra note 13, at 12.
Viola, supra note 11, at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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India, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and Brazil are also
considered to be potentially important to the formulation of a
new climate treaty.223 India’s share of total emissions is growing
rapidly and, in this decade, will likely surpass the emissions of
the European Union and the United States.224 Brazil has the
least carbon-intensive energy matrix225 of these nations and is
thus of much recent scholarly and political interest. Japan has
one of the less-intensive carbon economies of the world, and in
addition has strong human and technological capacity for the
transition to a low-carbon economy.226 South Korea is similarly
highly resource-capable and is very reform-minded.227 Russia is
among the most difficult nations in the climate debate as it has
very high per capita emissions and actually stands to benefit
economically from climate change.228 This is so because warmer
temperatures in Russia would mean an increased grain output
and savings on heating costs, further explained below. But, as
shown above, Russia has historically played a large role on the
international scene. It could be that a solution that excludes
Russia is not internationally acceptable.
The so-called “k group”—the minimum number of
countries necessary to make collective action rational within
climate change—is often said to be “about a dozen,” namely the
top ten emitters from fossil fuel usage plus Brazil and Indonesia;
two of the top emitters from changes in land use.229 Twelve—
incidentally also the size of most juries—is a number that many
“deliberative democrats argue is the optimal size for meaningful
deliberation.”230 Who would these be? The group should,
according to one theory, be comprised of “the most capable, the
most responsible and the most vulnerable.”231
The most capable are the leading developed economies
(using GDP as a proxy for capacity), which have the greatest
capacity to reduce emissions through technological innovation,
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Victor, supra note 175, at 95.
Eckersley, supra note 147, at 17.
Id. at 15.
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and the greatest capacity to assist developing countries with
mitigation and adaption. The most responsible are the parties
with the biggest historical, aggregate, and forecasted emissions,
and therefore the biggest scope to reduce emissions, with
appropriate acknowledgement of differences in per capita
emissions and development need. The most vulnerable are the
parties that are expected to suffer the harshest impacts of
climate change, and have the least capacity to adapt. The most
vulnerable are represented by three key negotiating blocs: the
Alliance of Small Island States (“AOSIS”), the African Group
(“AG”), and the Least Developed Countries (“LDC”).232
A group consisting of the United States, the European
Union, the AG, the Russian Federation, Japan, China, India,
Brazil, Korea, Mexico, AOSIS, and the LDCs has thus been
suggested because this would precisely capture the most
responsible, the most capable, and the most vulnerable by
including approximately 70% of total emissions as well as 70% of
the world population.233 Others have even gone further. Most
still promote “all major emitters,”234 which by most accounts
would amount to as many as approximately fifteen to twenty
parties.235
A few years ago, a highly influential article proclaimed that
the “magic number” that can break the world’s untenable
gridlock is “about twenty;” namely, the world’s twenty most
polluting nations.236 Yet others suggest action within already
existing architectures such as the MEF, G20, APP, OECD, the
WTO, and even the United Nations Security Council. The
number of parties of a climate agreement under the auspices of
these groups would supposedly be coterminous with their
general membership. The relevance of these architectures to the
climate change discourse is analyzed below.
Some experts list criteria for membership, not actual
numbers. For example, one source promotes a club consisting
232. Id. at 15–16.
233. Id. at 17.
234. See generally Obold et al., Impressions from Durban: COP-17 and Current Climate
Change Policies, 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 389 (2012); Bausch & Mehling,
supra note 20; Eckersley, supra note 147, at 16 (“Whatever criteria is employed to judge
capacity and responsibility, the major emitters tend to emerge at the top of the list.”).
235. See, e.g., Bausch & Mehling., supra note 20, at 132; Naim, supra note 12.
236. Naim, supra note 12.
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of “all [the] major current and future emitters and participants
who have the firm political will to act swiftly to achieve the 2°C
goal and a common vision on how to achieve this,” 237 but
recognizes that no venue or group of nations currently fulfills all
these criteria. Precisely for that reason we must stop the rhetoric
that perpetually and almost stubbornly promotes ideas that are
academically appealing, but practically unrealistic. Whatever the
exact number, this much is clear: much could be accomplished
by focusing more on the true climate change culprits rather
than making everyone pay the price for a problem
predominantly caused by only a few handfuls of states. Further,
only a limited number of states have the actual capability to
pioneer the technological innovation relevant to climate
change.238 A pragmatic solution with many fewer participants
than what is currently promoted in academic circles is
warranted.
Exactly who are the “major emitters” so frequently referred
to in the climate discourse? This will be examined next.
B. The World’s Current Top Twenty Emitters
The following were the world’s top twenty emitters in 2010
measured in million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent
(“MtCO2e”).239 The total global amount of MtCO2e was
44,542.240

237. Bausch & Mehling, supra note 20, at 132.
238. McGee, supra note 13, at 11–12.
239. WORLD RESOURCES INST., http://cait2.wri.org/wri/Country%20GHG%
20Emissions?indicator=Total%20GHG%20Emissions%20Excluding%
20LUCF&indicator=Total%20GHG%20Emissions%20Including%20LUCF&year=2010&
sortIdx=0&sortDir=desc&chartType= (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
240. Id.
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Rank Country

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

China
USA
EU (27)
India
Russia
Brazil
Germany
Indonesia
Iran
Canada
Mexico
South
Korea
United
Kingdom
Australia
South
Africa
France
Saudi
Arabia
Italy
Spain
Ukraine
Top ten
total
Top twenty
total

Total GHG
emissions
excluding landuse change and
forest activities
(“LUCFs”) (in
MtCO2e)
10,385
6,866
4,918
2,326
2,326
1,162
926
823
727
726
688
678

Total GHG
emissions
including
LUCFs (in
MtCO2e)

Percent of
world
total
(without
LCUFs)

10,081
6,775
4,823
2,304
2,317
2,136
926
1,170
727
726
706
679

23%
15%
11%
5%
5%
3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%

627

626

1%

587
560

736
560

1%
1%

545
542

532
542

1%
1%

515
408
390

497
393
383

1%
1%
1%
70%
82%
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Developing nations account for 60% of total global GHG
emissions.241
C. National Standpoints on International Climate Change Action
One thing is what we as scholars think “should” be done at
the supranational level. Quite another is what nations are
actually willing to do. Thankfully, a turning point in the rhetoric
among some key parties in relation to their national and
international commitments gives reason for optimism that some
parties will finally agree on effective action against climate
change. So what do some of the most relevant nations themselves
have to say about their stance on this issue? In the following, the
stance of, for brevity, the five currently largest emitters is
analyzed.
1. The United States
So far, the United States has never ratified any
internationally legally binding climate change agreement.242 In
2009, President Obama “pledged” to reduce the total US
emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020.243 The target was
not ratified by the Senate.244 The country is, however,
approximately halfway to meeting this target.245
In the summer of 2013, President Obama announced his
domestic Climate Action Plan (“Action Plan”), which also gave
several indications of what may be expected from the United
States in relation to international climate change efforts. Among
other things, the President called for “multilateral engagement”
on climate change and promised to “lead international efforts”
to combat the threat of climate change.246 The United States
241. Mitchell, supra note 7.
242. JAPAN TODAY, http://www.japantoday.com/category/world/view/obamawins-praise-abroad-for-climate-change-goals (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
243. Karl Ritter, UN Climate Boss: No Support for Tough Climate Deal, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Nov. 30, 2012), available at http://news.yahoo.com/un-climate-boss-no-supporttough-climate-deal-123816100.html.
244. JAPAN TODAY, supra note 242.
245. Michael Casey, US Defends ‘Enormous’ Climate Efforts at UN Talks, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Nov. 26, 2012, 3:19 PM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-defendsenormous-climate-efforts-un-talks-141052070—finance.html.
246. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 2; Press Release, White House, Office of
the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President Obama’s Plan to Cut Carbon Pollution (Jun. 25,
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“commit[ed] to expanding major new and existing international
initiatives including bilateral initiatives with China, India and
other major emitting countries.”247 The United States’ promise
to push for a global climate treaty in negotiations under the
UNFCCC.248 Accordingly, in a speech announcing the
publication of the Climate Action Plan, President Obama stated
that:
Four years ago, in Copenhagen, every major country agreed,
for the first time, to limit carbon pollution by 2020. Two
years ago, we decided to forge a new agreement beyond 2020
that would apply to all countries, not just developed countries.
What we need is an agreement that’s ambitious—because
that’s what the scale of the challenge demands. We need an
inclusive agreement—because every country has to play its
part. And we need an agreement that’s flexible—because
different nations have different needs.249

Of course, the US Senate would have to advise and consent
to American participation in an international climate change
treaty. With the persistent Congressional gridlock in relation to
a wide range of issues, it may be that the President’s above
statements are simply an expression of hope in an attempt to
give direction of what truly should happen rather than what is
actually likely to happen. This is especially troublesome given
the fact that the new treaty has been slated to take effect in 2015,
mere months away. Further, the President also disappointed
some environmentalists with his January 2014 State of the Union
address in which he touted his “all-of-the-above” energy strategy,
which includes “oil and natural gas production.”250 As has been
said, “[i]t is time to implement a different strategy focused on

2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/fact-sheet-presidentobama-s-climate-action-plan.
247. Id.
248. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN; Avery Fellow, President’s Climate Plan Said to Signal
U.S. Action on Ambitious 2015 Agreement, ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (BNA), at 1 (June 25,
2013).
249. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Climate Change,
Office of the Press Sec’y (Jun. 25, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/25/remarks-president-climate-change.
250. President Barack Obama, State of the Union 2014 Address, available at
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/01/state-of-the-union-2014-speech-transcripttext-video-102763.html.
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developing the ‘best of the above:’ solar, wind, renewables.”251
On the other hand, although federal climate legislation
collapsed in the Senate in 2010 and although the Senate
currently also appears unwilling to adopt a climate treaty, one
can hope that the string of severe weather events of recent
months in combination with the amount of sound economic
and scientific information calling for climate change action
could cause a watershed either under the current administration
or shortly thereafter. A tipping-point effect could happen
among US lawmakers, even though political interests
unfortunately still seem too solidly entrenched to facilitate
Senate treaty ratification in the near future.
As for who the United States sees as crucial members of a
possible new agreement and how inclusive a new agreement may
have to be, President Obama has previously refused to agree to
any solution that does not include China and India.252 The
Action Plan laments the fact that these two parties, as well as
“Brazil and other emerging economies,” did not have binding
obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.253 The Plan also cites the
fact that at the 2009 Copenhagen COP 15, “President Obama
and other world leaders agreed for the first time that all major
countries, whether developing or not, would implement targets
or actions to limit greenhouse emissions.”254 This is a positive.
Emerging economies are considered unlikely to join a new
climate regime if they do not believe that the historically largest
polluters will shoulder the majority of the burden.255 As for the
American call for what appears to be a very broad agreement
(“every country has to play its part”), time will have to tell
whether the United States will be unwilling to accept a less
inclusive agreement or whether the above is a rhetorical starting
position for the upcoming international negotiations, which
sophisticated negotiators know will have to include a certain
amount of compromise.

251. Email from Trip Van Noppen, Earthjustice, to members, (January 29, 2014,
4:27 PM) (emphasis in original) (on file with author).
252. See, e.g., Obold et al., supra note 234, at 394.
253. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 2, at 21.
254. Id.
255. O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 14–15.
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In early part of 2013, the United States reached what is seen
by the President and others as a crucial agreement with China to
jointly phase down the nations’ production and consumption of
hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”).256 The reduction of HFCs is
crucial to climate change mitigation and thus potentially a good
sign for future mutual agreement between these two nations. As
noted by King:
This is not a historic climate deal that will prevent the world
from smashing 2°C warming, nor will it lay the foundations
for long-term low carbon growth. [But the] agreement does
allow both countries to say they are taking dynamic and firm
action to address the causes of climate change—which isn’t
strictly accurate—and leverage control at UN talks crying
out for national leadership.257

Although not a groundbreaking agreement from a
substantive point of view, the US–China HFC deal does indicate
that these nations’ current negotiators are able to reach
consensus and close an important deal, which is at least
somewhat promising from a procedural point of view and an
improvement on the previous complete inaction in bilateral
MEAs between these two nations. But of course, more than mere
rhetoric is needed, and time will have to tell if this can be
obtained. The “on-again, off-again” nature of climate change
talks between the United States and China is cause for some
concern as to the true intent of these two nations. Nonetheless,
hope must be maintained that they can, soon, come to an
agreement in this area.
2. China
The Twelfth Chinese Five-Year Plan of 2011 sets binding
targets to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16%,
cut CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 17%, and raise the

256. Amena Saiyid & Daniel Pruzin, U.S. China Agree to Collaborate to Phase Down
Hydrofluorocarbons, ENERGY & CLIMATE REP. (BNA) (June 10, 2013); see also President
Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Climate Change, Office of the Press Sec’y
(Jun. 25, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/25/remarkspresident-climate-change; Ed King, US and China HFC Deal Needs Climate Health
http://www.rtcc.org/us-and-china-hfc-deal-needs-healthWarning,
RTTC.ORG,
warning/.
257. King, supra note 256.

2014]

THE "MAGIC NUMBER" IS THREE

427

proportion of non-fossil fuels in the overall primary energy mix
to 11.4%.258 Although China was the biggest CO2 polluter in
2012, the nation “still posted one of its lowest increases in a
decade, thanks to efforts on renewables deployment and
efficiency gains.”259 China is planning emissions caps for existing
and new industrial facilities in forty-seven major cities in
nineteen provinces,260 and has made progress toward reducing
its overall emissions.261
Internationally, China officially maintains its position of not
undertaking any total emissions reductions, but rather only GPDbound commitments. As for the Chinese position on
international obligations, China maintains that “rich nations”
“should become part[ies] to an extended Kyoto Protocol—an
emissions deal for some industrialized countries that the
Americans long ago rejected—or at least make ‘comparable
mitigation commitments.’”262 Not surprisingly, China promotes
the principle of CBDR.263
According to Lord Stern, “[l]eadership from US and China
is absolutely fundamental.”264 This is so because together, the
two nations account for a very large share of the global CO
emissions (close to or, in one estimate, more than 40% of CO2
emissions).265 In April 2013, China and the USA increased
cooperation significantly in a Climate Change Working Group
aimed at taking “forceful” action against climate change.266 In a
joint statement, the nations agreed that they realize that climate
change “threatens our economic livelihoods and our security”
and that they have thus “elevated this issue in our bilateral

258. NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N, CHINA’S POLICIES AND ACTIONS FOR
ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2012), available at http://qhs.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfg/
W020121122588539459161.pdf.
259. Mitchell, supra note 7.
260. Michael Standaert, China’s Environment Ministry Plans Emissions Caps for
Industrial Facilities, DAILY ENV’T REP. (BNA) (Mar. 12, 2013).
261. Obold et al., supra note 234, at 393–94.
262. Casey, supra note 245.
263. Obold et al., supra note 234, at 393.
264. Anthony Adragna, 2013 Offers World’s Best Opportunity for Broad Climate
Action, British Economist Says, INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) (Apr. 10, 2013).
265. Andrea Vittorio, U.S.-China Discussions Could “Reenergize” Cooperation on
Climate, Energy, Analysts Say, INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) (July 8, 2013).
266. Adragna, supra note 264.
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relationship.”267 Because China has previously been very
recalcitrant towards binding climate change action, this marks a
“big initial step” forward on climate action.268 During COP 19
UNFCCCC negotiations, China and India sought use of the
phrase “actions” which suggests less binding action than
“commitments,” which the United States and European Union
preferred.269 The parties reached a compromise agreement
using the term “contributions.” Although not overly promising,
it is at least an improvement over previous Chinese
unwillingness to adopt any language indicating any type of
legally binding requirements. This move in the right direction
may have a desirable ripple effect as India has also indicated its
willingness to be flexible, while Brazil has taken the cue from
China.270 Crucially, experts predict that “[o]ther holdouts will
jump on” and that an eventual international agreement can be
reached.271
Although executive agencies do not speak for the
international intent of their national governments, both the
State Environmental Protection Agency of China and the United
States Environmental Protection Agency have also indicated the
potential for what may come as follows:
The goal of [a 2012] joint United States (U.S.) and China
strategy is to enhance the effectiveness of collaborative efforts
to reduce the emissions intensity (air pollution and
greenhouse gases) of China’s rapidly growing economy.
Implementation of the joint strategy is intended to address
China’s severe local and regional air pollution problems
and reduce emissions that contribute to transboundary air
pollution, as well as regional and global climate impacts.272

267. Id.
268. Amena H. Sayid et. al., supra note 256.
269. Reed Landberg & Alex Morales, China, India Split with Other Developing
Countries over Wording in UN Summit Text, INT’L ENV’T REP. (BNA) (Nov. 25, 2013).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Strategy for Clean Air and Energy Cooperation
Between the Environmental Protection Agency of the United State of American and
the State Environmental Protection Administration of the People’s Republic of China
(2004) (emphasis added), available at http://www.epa.gov/oia/regions/Asia/china/
2004_sca_eng.pdf.
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Of course, the concern remains whether sufficient and
legally binding action is likely to be forthcoming from China or
whether the nation is, in fact, continuing to stall progress with
empty rhetoric. The same could, however, be said for the United
States. But hopefully these two parties will, in the nick of time,
realize the advantages of and necessity for mutually binding
action on climate change.
3. The European Union
The European Union’s current legally binding goal is for
the region to reach 20% GHG reductions from 1990 levels by
2020, a 20% share of total energy for renewable energy, and
voluntary target to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020—
the so-called “20 by 20”.273 The European Union has
additionally offered to increase its emissions reduction to thirty
percent by 2020 if other major emitting countries in the
developed and developing worlds commit to undertake their
“fair share” of a global emissions reduction effort.274 For the
long term, EU leaders have endorsed the “objective” of
reducing Europe’s greenhouse gas emissions by 80–95%
compared to 1990 levels by 2050 as part of efforts by developed
countries as a group to reduce their emissions. 275 A potential
new goal of 40% reduction by 2030 has been announced, which
would be consistent with an aim for the bloc to cut emissions
80–95% by 2050.276 However, this goal is an overall regional goal
that does not impose national targets. Some consider this “likely
to be much harder to enforce.”277 The European Parliament is
likely to proceed on this issue after elections in May 2014.278 The
European Union is on track towards meeting its targets for
273. The
EU
Climate
and
Energy
Package,
European
Comm’n,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/package/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
274. Id.
275. What is the EU Doing About Climate Change?, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 4,
2013).
276. Stephen Gardner, European Union to Aim for “Understanding” on Bloc’s 2030
Climate Goal by Mid-2014, INT’L ENVVT. REP. (BNA) (July 17, 2013); Stephen Gardner,
European Commission Proposes Binding EU 40 Percent Greenhouse Gas Cut by 2030, INT’L
ENV’T. REP. (BNA) (January 22, 2014).
277. Stephen Castle, European Union Proposes Easing of Climate Rules, N.Y. TIMES,
January 23, 2014.
278. Id.
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2020.279 EU emissions recently fell partly due to contracting
economies, but also due to extensive renewable energy usage.280
Supranationally and regionally, the European Union is
pressing for an agreement that is “ambitious, comprehensive
and legally binding.”281 According to Climate Action
Commissioner Connie Hedegaard: “The direction for Europe
has been set. If all other regions were equally ambitious about
tackling climate change, the world would be in significantly
better shape.”282 The European Union is not asking developing
nations to commit to absolute emission reductions, but makes it
known that they would be expected to begin reducing their
growth of emissions, and to commit to emissions reductions
after 2020.283 According to the Union, all major developing
countries should commit to reductions of 50% over 1990 levels
by 2050.284 Emerging economies must form part of a new
agreement and are unlikely to buy into a new set of targets if left
out of the conversation.285 But this does not mean that the
heaviest part of the burden will not have to be pulled by the
developed world.
4. India
India’s stance on both national and international climate
change efforts is outdated and unimpressive, although the
nation has made some progress toward reducing national
emissions.286 In 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh released
India’s first National Action Plan on Climate Change outlining
existing and future policies and programs addressing climate

279. EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Targets, EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/g-gas/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2013).
280. Mitchell, supra note 7.
281. The EU Climate and Energy Package, supra note 273.
282. Press Release, European Commission, 2030 Climate and Energy Goals for a
Competitive, Secure and Low-carbon EU Economy (Jan. 22, 2014), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-54_en.htm; Gardner, supra note 276.
283. Jutta Brunnee, Europe, the United States, and the Global Climate Regime: All
Together Now?, 24 J. LAND USE & ENVTL LAW 1, 19 (2008).
284. Id. at 19–20.
285. UN FOUNDATION, supra note 78.
286. Obold et al., supra note 234, at 394.
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mitigation and adaptation. 287 The plan identifies eight core
“national missions” running through 2017.288 Only the eighth
addresses international action involving India, but still only
references a “knowledge group” working with the global
community in research and technology development by
collaboration through “different mechanisms.” India has stated
that it “[w]ill meet our obligations under the UNFCCC,”289
which, however, included no exact or legally binding
commitments on the nation. India continually invokes the
CBDR principle and has issued no promising international
action indicators recently.
5. Russia
The Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation (the
“Doctrine”) represents Russia’s public policy on climate change
both within national borders and the international arena.290
Russia recognizes climate change as a security threat and
“focuses its efforts on lowering [] anthropogenic GHG
emissions,”291 but mentions no hard numbers. Instead, the
Doctrine vaguely cites to the “necessity to take climate change
into consideration as one of the major long-term elements of
the security of the Russian Federation and to put the problem of
global climate change, both in its national and international
dimensions, among the Russian Federation’s policy

287. CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, SUMMARY: INDIA’S NATIONAL
ACTION PLAN ON CLIMATE CHANGE, (2008), http://www.c2es.org/international/keycountry-policies/india/climate-plan-summary.
288. Id. These are (1) increasing solar energy’s share of total energy mix,
implementation of energy, (2) implementation of energy efficiency measures, (3)
sustainable urban planning and renewal, (4) optimization of water use efficiency, (5)
33% afforestation goal, (6) enhancing India’s ecosystem services, (7) making
agriculture more resilient to climate change, (8) establishing a National Mission on
Strategic Knowledge of Climate Change whose aim is to work with the global
community in research and technology development by collaboration through
different mechanisms.
289. National Mission on Strategic Knowledge for Climate Change, GOV’T OF INDIA,
DEP’T OF SCI. AND TECH., MINISTRY OF SCI. & TECH., 5 (August 2009) http://
www.environmentportal.in/files/Strategic%20knowledgeMission-09.pdf.
290. Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation, President of Russia, Official Web
Portal (Dec. 19, 2009), http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2009/12/
223509.shtml
291. Id. §§ 9, 23.

432 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:373
priorities.”292 As for international action, the Doctrine only
recognizes the need for “international equal partnership actions
of the Russian Federation in the framework of international . .
. projects concerning climate change.”293
In December 2012, a presidential order called for the
creation of an “interdepartmental taskforce on issues of climate
change and sustainable development.”294 At its first meeting in
2013, the task force “looked into issues of interdepartmental
cooperation in implementing the decisions of the [COP 18 in
Doha in 2012] as well as possible measures for stimulating the
reduction of man-made greenhouse gas emissions in the Russian
Federation.”295 The COP 18 extended the Kyoto Protocol until
2020, but limited it to only the European Union and eight other
industrialized nations that signed up for binding emissions cuts
by 2020.296 These represent about 15% of global emissions.297
The temporary agreement suffers from the lack of participation
of key industrialized nations and emerging nations such as,
among others, Russia. During the negotiations, Russia also
appeared to attempt to stall progress by calling into question the
voting rules. Russia insists on the continuation of consensus
voting, which is not a good sign for climate action under the
UNFCCC umbrella, at least until smaller, yet procedurally
effective, clubs are formed. That would make it easier to reach
the consensus insisted upon by Russia, unless by “consensus”
Russia means by all current UNFCCC parties. Unfortunately, this
may be the case.
The most significant problem in relation to Russia’s interest
in taking action against climate change is probably that the
nation does not see climate change as purely a negative, in fact,
quite the opposite: Russia’s Climate Change Doctrine—only
four years old—lists seven negative effects of climate change, but
292. Id. prmbl.
293. Id. § 7.
294. Meeting of Interdepartmental Taskforce on Issues of Climate Change and
Sustainable Development, President of Russia, Executive Office, March 13, 2013 http://
eng.state.kremlin.ru/administration/5111.
295. Id.
296. Louise Gray, Climate Change Deal Agreed at Doha Talks, TELEGRAPH (U.K.)
(December
8,
2012),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/environment/
climatechange/9731933/Climate-change-deal-agreed-at-Doha-talks.html.
297. Gray, supra note 256.
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also four positives.298 Additionally, Russia relies on its better
ability to adapt to climate change “compared with many other
countries and regions of the world” because of its vast territory,
substantial water resources, and relatively low population in
areas particularly vulnerable to climate change.299
The above unfortunately indicates that Russia is unwilling
to take imminent and internationally binding action against
climate change. The advantage of a narrowed regime complex is
that other nations can still forge a viable new agreement even
without Russia. After all, the nation only accounts for 5% of
global emissions. For sure, the democratically best solution
would be for Russia to form part of a new climate agreement,
but there is no need not to go ahead just because of Russia’s
persistent and egotistical “bad boy” behavior towards climate
mitigation.
D. New Constellation Options
Who, then, are the actors that are the most likely to agree
on joint action that would be at least somewhat effectual from a
scientific point of view, but more importantly, likely to spur even
further international agreement?
1. The Magic Number is Three
Parties that are considered key to the substantive issue at
hand are also widely considered procedurally necessary to its
solution.300 The United States is very widely considered one of
the major parties—if not the key party—in the climate change
context. The United States is the world’s historically largest
emitter, the world’s largest economy and, quite simply, a key
player in a great variety of international contexts. The United
States played key roles in the development of the Atlantic Treaty
System, the North Atlantic Fur Seal Treaty, the Montreal
Protocol, and, of course, in the US-Japan telecom agreement. It
298. The negative effects cited to include higher mortality rates, increased health
risks and ecological balance upsets, see Climate Doctrine of the Russian Federation,
supra note 290, § 27. The positives listed are decreased energy consumption, improved
Arctic freight hauling conditions, increased “cattle breeding efficiency” and increased
forestry efficiencies, see id. § 28.
299. Id. § 29.
300. O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 14.
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was among the founding members of the WTO, OECD, and the
G6, which morphed into the G7, G8, G8+5, and now the G20. It
is indeed unthinkable that a new climate treaty would exclude
the United States and still be considered supranationally
successful. Fortunately, the US President has finally indicated an
interest in joining an international regime complex, as shown
above.
In international discussions, China is approaching the same
level of importance as the United States in the development of a
new climate agreement or even surpassing it. As shown, the
United States continually refers to China in its rhetoric
pertaining to the parties necessary for the adoption of an
agreement. As demonstrated, Sino-American relations in climate
change contexts, specifically the important new HFC agreement,
have been improving. There are grounds for cautious optimism
that these two key nations will be able to agree on some climate
change action in the not too distant future, although US-Sino
relationships outside the climate context still appear to be
volatile and unpredictable. Treaty-making precedent clearly
shows that once bilateral action is taken, this typically spreads
progressively to multilateral action. This is exactly what is
needed in the current climate context.
As for India, not much, if anything, indicates that India is
capable of or willing to join any kind of international treaty
regime any time soon. This is unfortunate, but is India a crucial
party? The United States often refers to the nation in statements
regarding the new climate regime complex, but does that
necessarily mean that the United States would not adopt a new
agreement just because India was not a party if, for example, the
European Union, China, Brazil, or other important parties
joined a new regime? That question must be answered elsewhere
or by history, but this much is sure: the United States is currently
still bargaining from a position that includes India. However, as
a sophisticated and highly experienced party to international
negotiations and compromises, the United States may well agree
to leave India out of a future agreement if other key emerging
economies joined.
One such party could be Brazil. In the energy and climate
contexts, this country presents several unique conundrums:
more than 45% of Brazil’s energy comes from renewable
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sources, compared to only 6.7% for OECD countries.301 Between
2005 and 2009, Brazil was able to reduce its GHG emissions by
approximately 25%; the largest reduction ever recorded and
mainly due to a remarkable fall in Amazonian deforestation.302
Brazil is ranked one of the five countries with the largest
potential to reduce emissions by 2030.303 But Brazil is becoming
increasingly carbonized and is the only important economy in
the world in which there has been a recent increase in carbon
intensity if deforestation is not taken into account.304
Brazil has so far considered climate change to be primarily
an international relations and not a domestic issue.305 This
helped divert attention from other pressing issues such as local
land distribution and use issues.306 But climate change has
gained much political ground and is now central to the modern
Brazilian political context.307 Most notably, law number 12.187
from 2010 adopts Brazil’s voluntary national greenhouse gas
reduction target of between 36.1% and 38.9% of projected
emissions by 2020 with a baseline of 2005.308 Another aim is to
reduce the rate of de-forestation by 70% by 2017, which would
decrease greenhouse gas emissions by 4.8 billion tons.309 In the
international context, Brazil endorses the 2°C goal, supports
CBDR, and has traditionally opposed binding reductions targets
for non-Annex I countries including major emerging
economies, at least until 2020.310 Instead, Brazil has suggested
that only industrialized countries agree to reduce emissions by
40% by 2020.311 However, Brazil has recently been pushing in
301. Mikael Román & Marcus Carson, Shifting Ground: Brazil Tackles Climate
Change and Deforestation, but Rapid Growth, Energy Needs Undermine Process, STOCKHOLM
ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE (2010) 1, 1 available at http://www.sei-international.org/
mediamanager/documents/Publications/SEI-PolicyBrief-ShiftingGroundBrazil2010.pdf.
302. Viola, supra note 11, at 3.g
303. Román & Carson, supra note 301, at 1
304. Viola, supra note 11, at 4.g
305. Román & Carson, supra note 301, at 1
306. Id. at 2.
307. Id. at 1–2.
308. CLIMATE POLICY WATCHER, http://www.climate-policy-watcher.org/
?q=Brazil; WORLD RES. INST., http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/03/brazils-globalwarming-agenda; Viola, supra note 11, at 5.
309. CLIMATE POLICY WATCHER, supra note 308.
310. See Román & Carson, supra note 301, at 3; see also Viola, supra note 11, at 6.
311. Román & Carson, supra note 301, at 3.
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favor of some kind of commitments from non-Annex 1 countries
starting in 2020.312 In the UN context, Brazil has so far
negotiated in an alliance with emerging countries with an
energy matrix heavily dependent on fossil fuels (South Africa,
India, and China, the so-called “BASIC” alliance).313 But
importantly, “Brazil . . . [is] trying to diminish the distance
between the position of the European Union and the other
BASIC countries, particularly trying to persuade China and
India of the need to be more flexible and trying to make the
American position more flexible.”314 The real issue is thus,
for how long [] Brazil [will] maintain the recently created
imbalance between the domestic climate change policy with
reduction targets and the alliance with the more
conservative emerging powers like China, Russia and India.
Given the interests and relative power of different economic
sectors and the dynamics of the public opinion, it is
probable that this imbalance will not last long, and the
Brazilian position will tend to converge with the more
advanced EU, Japan and South Korea.315

The European Union consistently positions itself as in favor
of multilateralism, international law, and binding international
obligations.316 Accordingly, it heavily promotes far-reaching,
international measures to combat climate change and has
consistently done so for some time. There exists a marked EU
“desire [for] . . . the creation of an ‘elite-driven, treaty-based,
legal order,’ a supranational political entity dedicated to respect
for human rights and the rule of law.”317 Modernly, human
rights are considered to comprise environmental law and rights
as well.318 It is, in short, clear that the European Union remains

312. Viola, supra note 11, at 6.
313. Id. at 5–6.
314. Id. at 6.
315. Id. at 9.
316. Brunnee, supra note 283, at 30.
317.
Id. at 30. Brunnee also cites to other potential reasons behind the
European Union’s strong motivation for a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and the
adoption of a future treaty such as the desire to cast the European Union as not only an
“anonymous” bureaucracy, but a purposive and influential international player.
318. See, e.g., Myanna Dellinger, An Unstoppable Tide: Creating Environmental and
Human Rights Law from the Bottom Up, 15 OR. REV. INT’L L. 63 (2013).
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a strong advocate of a treaty-based solution to climate change.319
For these and other reasons, the European Union is arguably
the most serious and also one of the world’s most crucial parties
to the adoption of a legally binding international solution. All
indicators point towards the European Union’s willingness to be
flexible in the upcoming work to be done and to adopt, if not
just “any” international solution, then certainly one with a range
of different constellation options, as long as these included
substantively effective goals.
Although the United States and the European Union still
have some differences regarding the size of the GHG emissions
reductions goals required for an effective solution, who should
undertake these, which of the emerging economies should form
part of a possibly renewed agreement, and what funding should
be provided to these, there can be no serious dispute that if a
breakthrough happened in relation to, most crucially, the
Chinese position on climate change, the European Union and
the United States would most likely be able to come together on
these issues. Both parties have serious international clout.
Examples abound of their mutual cooperation in many other
financial, scientific, technical, and territorial contexts. They
would, in all likelihood, be able to agree on climate change as
well.
Thus, a minilateral constellation for a new climate change
regime could look like this: the United States is a necessary key
player. But even without the United States, the European Union
will very likely join a new treaty. Both the United States and the
European Union call for the inclusion of at least some players
from the Global South that are willing and able to undertake at
least some legally binding action. China seems to be the party
that the United States and European Union most frequently
have in mind, and has indeed very recently indicated some
willingness to proceed with an agreement with at least the
United States, albeit the extent of these intentions still remains
unclear at this late stage. However, a trilateral union may not be
sufficiently broad for the United States and European Union;

319. As recently as in January of 2014, EU Climate Action Commissioner Connie
Hedegaard stated that “the direction for Europe has been set” and encouraging other
nations to follow suit. Gardner, supra note 276.
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the world’s de facto drivers of action. Historical treaty contexts
and climate negotiations show that at least one more major
emerging economy may be required. This could be India or
Russia, but they both appear unwilling to take any legally
binding and substantively effective action anytime soon. Thus,
“new kid on the block” Brazil could soon overtake the previous
relevance of these two nations in this context. Indeed, Brazil
itself now promotes commitments by developing nations and is
shifting its negotiation position towards a closer alliance with the
European Union and the United States, which is highly
promising. With Brazil and hopefully other parties, a landslide
could finally occur in supranational negotiations.
Accordingly, the “magic number”—to recall, “the smallest
possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible
impact on solving a particular problem” or at least instigating
crucial action towards a resolution—is, in the climate change
context, three: the United States, the European Union, and
China. This constellation would account for 49% of the world’s
total GHG emissions. And with Brazil as an increasingly likely
fourth player, 52% of global GHGs would be accounted for.
Scientifically, this is arguably not a high enough percentage to
solve the ultimate problem, but as the above analyses show,
broader multilateral action can be derived progressively from
narrower beginnings, so even a coalition of “just” three or four
initial parties may be enough. For example, in the case of the
Seal Treaty, four major economic and population powerhouses
who used and financially benefitted from the disputed resource
were enough for a successful resolution. Of course, differences
between the two situations exist, but this much is clear:
international agreements start somewhere. So far, the
international community has gained literally nothing from
attempting the broadest possible solution; near-global treaty
participation. It may well be that Denmark, after all, had a good
point in its 2009 Copenhagen “Danish Solution” to narrow the
constellation of participating countries very significantly and to
seek entirely new commitment and financing solutions. But
where that solution went wrong was that it did not include the
truly key parties, but rather only included the United States, the
European Union, and Denmark itself. Such a constellation will
not work. The above one will.
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Some have mentioned the possibility of the five permanent
members of the UN Security Council forming a climate
coalition. Advantageously, this would include the major climate
powerhouses of Russia, the United States, and China. Such a
coalition could also advantageously include some developing
nations. But France and the United Kingdom—the other
Security Council members—would likely negotiate not
individually, but from an EU platform. Thus, a solution taking
its starting point in a Security Council membership is more
likely to include the United States, Russia, China, and the
European Union; in other words, again a narrow solution of a
small handful of parties. However, a Security Council
background is of mainly academic interest, as will be analyzed
below.
2. Jury-sized Options
Recall that twelve is a number that is thought to be ideal for
meaningful democratic discussion. Recall also that climate
rhetoric frequently mentions “the major emitters” by referring
to, typically, the ten to twelve nations with the highest GHG
emissions. Would a twelve-party solution work? The top twelve
nations would include parties currently very willing to take
decisive action (the European Union), but also some who are
very likely not (India, perhaps Russia). Additionally, it would
include parties among whom some current geopolitical friction
exists (the United States, Russia, and Iran). But as the ATS
demonstrated, agreements on even highly contested issues
among rivaling powerhouses can be reached, even in volatile
times. The ATS also started with just twelve parties and grew
from there. By applying the tactics and theories analyzed above,
it could happen again. The top twelve GHG emitters account for
a total of 74% of the world’s emissions. It is tempting to think
“the more, the better,” but such rhetoric brings with it the
problems described above.
Incidentally, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (“OPEC”) also consists of twelve members. What
about calling for them to reach an agreement? After all, oil and
gas are major physical sources of the problem itself, so maybe it
would not be too much to trace a solution to the actual source
in a sort of “strict liability”-based solution. But the organization
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consists of nations that are neither committed to climate action
nor among the major emitters from a current or historical
perspective, which makes this idea unviable.
In some jurisdictions, juries consist of just six members. The
top six nations in the climate context—China, United States,
European Union, India, Russia, Brazil, and Germany—account
for 62% of the problem. However, it is arguably better to base
rhetoric on who is the most likely to join an agreement that will
have at least some scientific substance to it from the beginning,
and, more importantly, that will kick start a situation of broader
minilateral constellations or progressive multilateralism rather
than simply pick a random number from the top down.
3. Tracks
At bottom, “track” or “tier” solutions simply denote clubs
of nations agreeing on certain issues. As mentioned, excellent
scholarship already explores such tracks. In this context, it is
important to apply a pragmatic approach and examine which
options are the most likely to be adopted and lead to further
steps or emulation by others, not to discuss who “should” do
what. A possible constellation could include the European
Union, AOSIS, the LDC, and the African Group as one whose
members are the most capable, the most vulnerable, and, as a
new very important consideration, the most willing to take
action (the European Union). Another could cover the United
States, European Union, Canada, and Australia as the most
capable and most responsible. However, that constellation
would comprise no developing nations and is thus problematic.
A group consisting of the European Union, China, India, Brazil,
and the LDC would include what are currently the most
responsible and the most vulnerable, but that constellation does
not include the United States and is thus unlikely to make a
deep enough impact substantively and, in particular,
procedurally.
In theory, constellation options abound. At the end of the
day, the crux of the matter is to find workable solutions among
just enough nations that will pave the way for others to join for a
variety of pragmatic, not scholarly, reasons.
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III. IS THE UNFCCC STILL “THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN”?;
THE “WHERE”
After the lackluster Copenhagen COP 15 outcome, and
even before, a wide range of different negotiating platforms and
governance architectures have been proposed for future climate
change efforts. In addition to the UNFCCC, these typically
include the G20, WTO, OECD, the UN Security Council, and
even the UN General Assembly. The most relevant of these is
arguably still the UNFCCC, occasionally referred to as the “only
game in town.”320 This Section will briefly demonstrate the
advantages of using this architecture and the supranational
consensus that supports doing so before proceeding to an
analysis of the relevance of some other forums that may
complement the UNFCCC.
A. The UNFCCC; Back to the Future
The many advantages of using the UNFCCC umbrella
cannot be denied. First, there is arguably no reason to waste
precious resources in creating new content from scratch when
an existing global framework for action already exists.321 The
UNFCCC already has a staff of five hundred and much expertise
to address the problem.322 A new architecture would create the
risk of forum shopping. Climate governance would become even
more fragmented than it already is. Activities and mandates
would overlap, which might create unnecessary redundancies.
Tensions would arise as would inconsistencies and potential
undermining of one framework by the other; not desirable in
periods of already scarce resources and time. A certain amount
of competition is healthy in most contexts, but not when there is
a risk that attention will focus on the institutional players and
processes instead of the underlying problem, as could happen if
another climate platform were created. In reality, attempts to
320. J. Jack Ewing, 2015 the New Copenhagen? The UNFCCC Process RisksFalling into
Faulty Patterns, (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.academia.edu/2479375/2015_the_New_
Copenhagen_The_UNFCCC_Process_Risks_Falling_into_Faulty_Patterns; J. Jack Ewing
& Gianna Gayle Amul, 2015 the New Copenhagen? The UNFCCC Process RisksFalling into
Faulty Patterns (Jan 2013), http://www.rsis.edu.sg/nts/HTML-Newsletter/Bulletin/
pdf/NTS-Bulletin-jan-2013.pdf.
321. UN FOUNDATION, supra note 78.
322. Bausch & Mehling, supra note 20, at 137.
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steer action away from the UNFCCC have not succeeded in
gaining sufficient political weight to shape the climate agenda.323
There is consensus among most, if not all, governments that the
appropriate venue for developing the post-2012 climate
framework is the UNFCCC.324 Governments are willing to invest
political capital and resources to defend the UNFCCC climate
regime against attempts to sideline it.325 After Copenhagen, this
willingness probably decreased somewhat, but it has gained
momentum again. Quite simply, the “UNFCCC is the only body
that can deliver a comprehensive, legally binding international
treaty.”326 Much indicates that the UNFCCC is, again, if not the
only, then certainly the most relevant game in town.
B. Complementary Forums
Diverse negotiating platforms within an overall architecture
are beneficial to treaty drafting processes in general. In
connection with the Montreal Protocol, for example, the parties
took advantage of differing forums and working groups as a
complement to, but not a replacement of, the main forums.327
“The use of small, private negotiating platforms in the
beginning stages of negotiations was conducive to negotiations
on issues that sharply divided coalitions.”328
Alternative negotiation settings outside the UNFCCC
umbrella can, as a complement to the UNFCCC, also help move
issues to a higher political level and allows parties to explore
contentious issues without the pressure of needing to advocate
rigid diplomatic positions.329 Further, they provide an arena for
less formal interaction between large emitters that often have
diametrically opposed positions.330 “Fortunately, it no longer
appears that any of the major international forums addressing
climate mitigation are directly counteracting each other.”331 For

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 134.
Bodansky, supra note 203, at 2.
Bausch & Mehling, supra note 20, at 134.
Eckersley, supra note 147, at 40.
O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 13.
Id.
Bausch & Mehling, supra note 20, at 134.
Id.
Id. at 133.
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completeness, the rest of this Article thus examines the major
international forums that could supply alternative climate
negotiation opportunities.
1. The UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly
Climate change has long been recognized to have serious
security implications. There is a clear nexus to the work of the
UN Security Council. A solution by the Security Council itself or
even the creation of a new “Climate Council”332 as a subsidiary
organ have been suggested, as has bringing climate change
action into the authority sphere of the UN General Assembly.
The above discussion of the general advantages and
disadvantages of climate change work in non-UNFCCC forums is
relevant here as well, but in particular, climate work
negotiations and other action under the UN Security Council in
particular might be taken more seriously by the world’s nations
and thus help break the stalemate that has persisted in this area
for more than twenty years. The Security Council has been
trialed in regulating non-state actors already. It has more
authority—real and perceived—than the UNFCCC. Some of this
is obviously coercive by nature, but some recent progressive
action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter333 resembles law
making rather than mere enforcement. For example, Resolution
1373, a post 9/11 counterterrorism measure, called on all states
to “adjust their national laws” so that they can ratify all existing
international conventions on terrorism. Resolution 1540 covers
the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(“WMDs”). It requires all member states to “develop and
332. See, e.g., Eckersley, supra note 147, at 19. Article 7 of the United Nations
Charter allows for this: “Such subsidiary organs as may be found necessary may be
established in accordance with the present Charter.” U.N. Charter art. 7.
333. Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations governs “Action with
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.” U.N.
Charter ch. VII. Article 39 stipulates that “[t]he Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall
make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with
Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security” U.N.
Charter art. 39 (emphasis added). Climate change has been recognized to carry with it
an inherent threat to the peace in cases where, for example, large population segments
seek to emigrate to unwilling host nations as water resources become more and more
scarce or as land in the emigrants’ original host nations becomes unlivable or
submerged.
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enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures” against the
proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
other WMDs, as well as their spread to non-state actors.
Resolution 1308 relates to the impact of AIDS on peace and
security. All three of these resolutions are binding on all
members without their signature and backed by the possibility of
coercive sanctions. In other words, they are examples of
veritable international institutional law-making without
necessarily having to reach global consensus on a given issue.
But all three govern existing, on-the-ground effects with current
military implications, which is not yet perceived to be the case
with climate change. Although “a small minority of writers
believe that there are any legal limits to the discretion of the
Security Council in identifying a threat to the peace . . . [most]
share the view that the Council’s determination under [Article
39 of Chapter VII] is essentially political”334 and unlikely to be
immediately forthcoming in relation to climate change. In fact,
the Council has “not to date shown any great alacrity in
identifying environmental threats to the peace.”335
Expecting the Security Council to act legislatively against
climate change involves a “securitization issue,” in other words,
“referring to an issue that has hitherto been conceptualized only
in political, economic, environmental or other terms as a
security threat so as to heighten awareness of the issue and the
urgency of taking effective action.”336 For now, the Council is
more likely to react in response to the consequences of climate
change rather than addressing the substantive problem itself.337
Thus, imminent “legislative” action by the Security Council is
only a theoretical opportunity. And although, strictly seen, there
are no legal limits to the Council’s mandates as long as they
revolve around security implications, there are practical limits at
issue. In this context, those are the political obstacles presented
by members with veto powers potentially having to vote against

334. Shirley Scott, Climate Change and Peak Oil as Threats to International Peace and
Security: Is It Time for the Security Council to Legislate?, 9 MELB. J. INT’L L. 495, 502 (2008).
335. Id. at 503.
336. Shirley Scott, The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics: How Close
Have We Come and Would Full Securitization Enhance the Efficacy of Global Climate Change
Policy?, 21 RECIEL 221 (2012) (emphasis added).
337. Id. at 228.
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their own self-interest. As long as they have no interest in taking
action against climate change, they are equally unlikely to do so
under the Security Council as under the UNFCCC architectures.
What has the Council itself said about climate change? In
2007, the Council had its first debate on the issue. Focus was as
much on the appropriate international forum within which to
address the problem as on the substantive part of the problem
itself.338 Discussions echoed the general North/South divide,
and the G77 and China took a stance against the Security
Council being the appropriate forum for climate change
action.339 In a 2011 debate, the Council did not take a position
on climate change, but did express concern that security issues
would be implicated “in the long run.”340 The G77 and the nonaligned movement remained averse to the idea. 341
Just as the imminently needed action is unlikely to come
from the Security Council, it is equally unlikely to stem from the
General Assembly. In its first debate on climate change security
in 2009, the General Assembly reaffirmed the UNFCCC as the
key instrument for addressing climate change.342
2. The WTO
The nexus between climate change and the WTO is both
contextual and financial in nature. As with the WTO, climate
change involves issues of increasing international trade and
development, both of which lead to rapidly increasing levels of
GHG. Climate change has significant global trade and other
cross-border economic implications such as national subsidies,
border tax instruments, obligations to purchase emission
permits, and other measures that may intersect with legally
binding WTO rules.343 Both areas have come to need a
supranational regulatory regime for orderliness and, in the case
of climate change, even implications involving life and death.
The trade regime creates welfare benefits to individual nations.
338. Id. at 225.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 226.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 225.
343. Recall the “schedules” analysis above and the fact that nations record
commitments to the progressive removal of barriers to goods and services.
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In contrast, the climate regime governs the global commons and
increased global welfare, but individual nations taking unilateral
action may suffer welfare losses.344 These must either be
compensated for, or, alternatively, economic “welfare” benefits
to acting nations should be established345 in order for
sufficiently incentivize these nations. Thus, in climate
negotiations, the short-term goals for acting nations are to
maintain national welfare and mercantile interests whereas the
end goal is to increase global welfare.346
The legal authority of the WTO would be an advantage to
the organization also addressing climate change, but significant
hurdles present themselves in this context. First, the WTO
currently has 159 members and is, as the UNFCCC, consensusbased. Reducing the number of voting parties from 195 (in the
case of the UNFCCC) to 159 is unlikely to make the necessary
difference in reaching a substantively effective international
agreement.
Most importantly, the WTO’s main focus is trade issues, not
climate change. This situation could, however, change. The
rules that enable divergence from the WTO agreement rules
(governing trade) are known as “exceptions.” Article XX of the
GATT provides that “nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of
measures . . . necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health, and . . . relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources.”347 There is thus apparent and “squarely applicable”
authority for exceptions from the existing trade-focused rules.
Nonetheless, Article XX authority has not led to any results of
any relevance to climate action so far, and it is unlikely to do so
within the next months and years before a new agreement
simply has to be adopted to avoid catastrophic effects of climate
change.
Alternatively, GATT Article XXI provides that:
Nothing in the Agreement shall be construed to . . . prevent
any member from taking any action which it considers
344. Ghosh, supra note 130, at 2.
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, April 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 187 (emphasis added).
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necessary for the protection of its essential security
interests . . . (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or . . . (c) to prevent any contracting
party from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations
under the United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.348

Even though Article XXI appears alluringly relevant to
climate change seen from an environmental advocacy point of
view, application of the Article has been interpreted to require
the specific purpose of preserving national security.349
Application of Article XXI to climate change solutions is thus
currently a stretch as climate change has not yet actually and
demonstrably resulted in any national security implications.
There have been no ultimate panel or Appellate Body decisions
addressing this exception since the WTO was established in
1995.350 In US-Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, the Panel simply
concluded that it was not authorized to examine the reasons for
justification under Article XXI and thus unable to determine if
the measures in question were defensible.351 In other words,
even though it could, the WTO is, in reality, disinclined to use
its authority to address matters implicating the security of a
nation state. The United States would likely also continue to
resist this. For example, US officials declined participating in a
WTO dispute with the European Union regarding the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act because the “panel lacked
competence to adjudicate on a national security issue.”352 Thus,
Article XXI is also unlikely to be applied presently, and
presently is what is needed in the climate change arena.
3. The G20 and OECD
Scholarship also frequently raises the issue of whether
climate change could more advantageously be addressed in
smaller economic settings such as the G20 or the OECD.

348. Id. art. XXI(b).
349. Felicity Deane, The WTO, the National Security Exception and Climate Change, 2
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 149, 155 (2012).
350. Id.
351. Id. at 155–56; Report of the Panel, United States–Imports of Sugar from
Nicaragua, L/5492 (Mar. 16, 1983).
352. Deane, supra note 349, at 156.
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Similar to the climate change problem, the 2008 financial
crisis revealed the numerous and severe shortcomings of an
existing regulatory system—in that case financial regulations.
The crisis spurred international cooperation over these
regulatory issues.353 The G20 stepped in and leaders provided
much needed short-term crisis management,354 which is what is
needed with climate change as well. Of course, regulations had
to be implemented at the national level as the G20 cannot
create any legally binding protocols and has few monitoring and
enforcement tools.355 But the world became aware that rules had
to be created, scrapped, or changed via G20 and other
international attention. The need for similarly swift action by
“champions,” as with the G20 leaders, is needed in the climate
context too.
The advantages of climate action spurred by the G20
platform is that it is more flexible and able to act more swiftly
than bigger architectures precisely because it creates no legally
binding protocols. If the G20 could instigate action against
climate change among its own members, this would be
significant, as the G20 nations account for more than 80% of
global GHG emissions.356
But significant obstacles exist that make the G20 an
unrealistic actor for change. Perhaps most importantly, precisely
because the Group is not able to take legally binding action, it is
unlikely to be much more than yet another forum for
discussions. Legal action is needed, not more discussion forums.
Further, strong opposition within the G20 to the Group
addressing climate change comes from such formidable and
numerous parties as China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa,
Argentina, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia.357 This may simply be
insurmountable to action within the G20. Apart from the
impetus for financial regulatory change after the 2008 crisis, the
Group has displayed an unfortunate stagnation in the
development of both climate change and economic policies.358
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

O’BRIEN & GOWAN, supra note 15, at 16.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 18.
Viola, supra note 11, at 1.
Id.
Id.

2014]

THE "MAGIC NUMBER" IS THREE

449

The G20 has come to suffer from a severe image problem. It is
simply not considered significantly important by the
international community359 and lacks ultimate, decisive
leadership. In the words of Al Gore:
Meetings of the G20 have become little more than a series
of annual opportunities for the leaders of its component
nations to issue joint press releases [wearing matching
outfits] . . . . [This resembles] the parable of the child
who notices that the emperor has no clothes. Except in this
case, the clothes have no emperor.360

If perception is reality, action is unlikely to come from the
G20. Thus, efforts would arguably be better spent on addressing
climate change within the UNFCCC, which is, as described
above, seen globally to be a more appropriate forum for this.
As for the OECD (which problematically does not include
China and India among its members), the organization does
recognize climate change as a key policy concern for the 21st
century, but refers and defers to the UNFCCC for action361:
“The objective of the work on long-term issues is to investigate
how possible policy decisions, including future commitments,
may progressively ensure the long term success of the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change.”362
CONCLUSION
Much climate change discourse centers on misconceptions
of almost mythical proportions. This could prove detrimental in
treaty negotiation contexts. As scholars, we must stop promoting
rhetoric that has proved to lead to literally no substantive results
in the climate change context.
For example, one myth is that a solution to climate change
is virtually impossible to reach at the supranational level because
of the complex science involved and the contested political
background among nations. In reality, nations have—as in the

359. Id.
360. GORE, supra note 192, at 94.
361. Climate Change, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/ (last visited March 8,
2014).
362. Post 2012 Framework and Other Issues, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/env/cc/
post-2012frameworkotherissues.htm.
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case of the Antarctic Treaty System—been willing to give up
positions that were thought to present insurmountable obstacles
to an international legal solution at the time in question, even in
times of a much more volatile political climate than now (such
as the Cold War). As international environmental scholars, we
often lament the fact that climate change is not ranked as highly
on national agenda as arguably should be the case and worry
that this means that no national and thus supranational solution
can be found. It does not. Treaty history demonstrates that it is
simply not a must that a given problem is ranked very highly on
any national political agenda for a solution to still be found.
Very frequently, scholars and policy-makers alike cite to national
“moral obligations” and what nations “should” do, but
sometimes largely ignore the perhaps ugly fact that money is
typically the main concern, even in the climate negotiation
context. Discussing risks and morality has led to virtually
nothing so far. Monetary benefits must form a greater part of
the rhetoric and solution. The Montreal Protocol, for example,
presented a difficult technical and scientific background just
like climate change does, but a solution was found because,
among other factors, nations such as the United States realized
the economic benefits to be reaped at the national level from an
international solution.
Another major line of thought holds that broadly accepted
democratic methods have to be used in the climate negotiation
context. This would, of course, be ideal, but reality shows that
this too is not a must: some degree of coercion, secrecy,
backroom deals, noninclusive voting processes, and small,
exclusive clubs have been used—with success—in treaty contexts
ranging from the Antarctic Treaty and Fur Seal Treaty processes
decades ago to the Copenhagen COP 15 just a few years ago.
Granted, it of course took more than just such methods, and
some time, to create the needed breakthroughs, but these might
very well not have been secured had parties not taken action
that might, from an academic point of view, be frowned upon.
Realism is different than idealism. Both play important roles in
the development of the law, but with climate change, whatever
may be able to break the current stalemate situation must be
considered seriously because of the urgent nature of the
underlying problem.
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To be considered successful, a new climate treaty must
likely be legally binding and include both developed and
developing nations. All indicators show that the United States
and China are crucial to a new solution. On the one hand, this
appears troublesome because of the recalcitrant stance
historically taken by both of these parties towards legally binding
action at the national and international levels. However, the
good news is that both have recently indicated at least some
interest in both national and supranational-level action against
climate change. Granted, a watershed may have to happen for
these parties to ratify a new climate treaty, but with much recent
focus on severe weather events, extreme pollution levels and the
costs of climate change, one can hope that the Unites States and
China will be willing to join a new treaty if the other
considerations outlined above are also taken into account.
One of the most prevalent myths is perhaps that all 195
parties to the UNFCCC or at least “all” major emitters must
form part of a new regime complex. Reality shows that focusing
on smaller clubs in the beginning phases of treaty
development—even just bilateral solutions to start with—can
lead to much broader results. For example, even the European
Union and WTO started with constellations much narrower
than their current ones. What is needed is individual
negotiation “champions” and nations that can promote the
formation of such clubs in the newly restarted climate change
treaty development context. These clubs could and likely would,
as part of more progressive multilateralism, lead to the broader
international solutions that so many call for. Currently, it makes
little sense to continue hoping for very broad solutions,
especially those that call for “all” major emitters, as these
include highly recalcitrant nations such as India and Russia who
still appear unlikely to adopt international solutions, especially
in just another year or two. Whether democratically ideal or not,
club formation is already well underway under the UNFCCC
umbrella as shown by the Copenhagen COP 15 development.
Even though not initially successful—in fact quite the
opposite—the history of the Copenhagen Accord nonetheless
shows how a related base agreement among just five initial
nations can develop into a document adopted by more than 140
nations just one year later. This additionally speaks to the
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concern that there is no time for narrow solutions now: there is,
in fact, no time not to take some action even if it is initially not as
broad as should have been. The Montreal Protocol, European
Union, Antarctic Treaty System, and Seal Treaty contexts
analyzed above also broadened fairly rapidly. Legal pragmatism
is, in this context, better than legal idealism.
What, then, is the crucial number of nations that is likely to
set action in motion that could, finally, have both a substantive
and procedural effect? Although successful treaties have in some
cases started with mere bilateral agreements, a climate deal is
likely to require broader membership. As shown, the European
Union is likely to join an agreement between the United States
and China or other major developing nations. Recently, Brazil
has appeared on the world stage as a potential and highly
relevant candidate for a new treaty. Experts predict that if an
agreement is reached between the United States, China, or
another developing nation, other “holdouts” will join. Thus, the
answer to how many nations currently constitute the “critical
mass” needed in the climate negotiation arena is three. Such an
agreement is most likely to be reached under UNFCCC auspices.
However, the UNFCCC framework currently calls for consensus
by almost 200 member states, a virtually impossibly large
platform for agreement on the issue as long as it remains as
narrowly formulated as it has so far. Accordingly, the consensus
to be reached by the parties under that regime must, instead, be
focused on a solution that allows for a much more tiered and
club-based approach as described above. Or perhaps ranks will
have to be so completely broken that a separate Protocol for a
handful of some nations with a separate Protocol for others is
the only legally realistic solution in the very limited amount of
time remaining before 2015. Although the UNFCCC remains
the most competent architecture for addressing climate change
in general, other complementary forums could take steps to egg
along the process or, most realistically, provide additional
forums for related technical, trade-related, or national security
issues.
The last successes of large-scale, international governance
date back two decades to the adoption of the WTO and,
incidentally, the UNFCCC itself. Since then, not much has been
accomplished at a level including literally hundreds of nations.
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Solutions that may not be seen as “perfect” may have to suffice
when it comes to climate change to get at least some action
underway as soon as possible. In other contexts of extreme
moral and other importance, compromises have also been
reached for the sake of obviously necessary progress. For
example, in the words of Thaddeus Stevens, a fierce opponent
of slavery and discrimination against African Americans, on the
alteration of his original proposal for the 14th Amendment:
Do you inquire why, holding these views and possessing
some will of my own, I accept so imperfect a proposition? I
answer, because I live among men and not among angels;
among men as intelligent, as determined, and as
independent as myself, who not agreeing with me, do not
choose to yield their opinions to mine. Mutual concession,
therefore, is our only resort, or mutual hostilities.363

Let us hope that nations will avoid mutual hostilities in
their upcoming climate change negotiations and instead reach
workable solutions before it is too late to avoid truly catastrophic
climate change.

363. THADDEUS STEVENS SOCIETY,
Quotes.html (last visited March 8, 2014).
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